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1317 
PRE-ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION NEEDED FOR 
TAXING PROCEDURES 
Stephanie Hunter McMahon* 
Abstract: Courts have opened tax guidance to procedural attack. Consequently, taxpayers 
who are found to owe tax may challenge the validity of the guidance implementing the tax if 
the procedure used by the Treasury Department in adopting the guidance failed to comply 
with the Administrative Procedure Act, in particular, with notice-and-comment. This 
increased willingness to consider tax guidance’s procedural defects offers little to most 
taxpayers unless they are also given a better means to raise procedural challenges. Under 
current law and in most circumstances, generally, taxpayers can bring a challenge only after 
they have been found to owe taxes in an audit and completed an internal IRS appeal process. 
This delay in the ability to challenge guidance reduces the likelihood taxpayers will 
challenge the procedure used to create a particular rule. Moreover, delayed litigation requires 
taxpayers to plan their affairs under the umbrella of guidance that might not survive a 
procedural challenge. To the extent procedural challenges are accepted in the tax context, this 
Article argues Congress should narrowly repeal its prior limitations on pre-enforcement 
litigation of those procedures. Everyone affected by the guidance should be permitted to 
litigate procedural questions for a period of time post-promulgation without the necessity of 
being found to owe taxes. This narrow exception would increase the certainty of tax guidance 
and encourage greater public participation in the guidance-formation process in a way that is 
sensitive to the fact that litigation imposes costs on the Treasury Department. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Politicians demand a more fair, more efficient, and simpler tax system 
as the press rails against problems plaguing the tax system’s 
administration.1 However, improving the tax system and making 
substantive change to tax administration, whether or not considered 
independently of the substance of the tax law, is not easy. Protecting 
taxpayer rights while raising the revenue necessary to fund our 
government is a complicated balancing act. That balancing requires 
compromise resulting from a sensitivity to the push and pull between 
taxpayers’ rights (and some taxpayers’ desire not to pay taxes) and the 
system’s administration (and the need for revenue). 
Balancing these competing interests in the complicated world of 
taxation is hard. It is made more difficult by the fact that tax is an area of 
law recognized as unique and yet bound by general systems of law. 
Historically, a silo evolved around taxation that allowed the tax system 
to develop its own answers to procedural questions; that silo is now 
being challenged. Those challenges often do not fully consider the 
unintended consequences that arise when tax administration is forced 
into ill-fitting procedures that work imperfectly for other government 
agencies and were certainly not created with the tax system in mind.2 
                                                     
* Professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. I would like to thank participants at 
the Protecting Taxpayer Rights Symposium, University of Washington School of Law’s Graduate 
Tax Program, and the University of Dayton School of Law for their thoughtful feedback on earlier 
drafts of this paper, and my colleagues Michael Solimine and Brad Mank, and the Harold C. Schott 
Foundation for financial support. 
1. See Naomi Jagoda, House Committee Votes to Censure IRS Head, HILL (June 15, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/283576-house-committee-votes-to-censure-irs-head [https://perma. 
cc/WK4W-BGPW]; National Taxpayer Advocate Identifies Priority Areas and Challenges in Mid-
Year Report to Congress, IRS (July 16, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/national-
taxpayer-advocate-identifies-priority-areas-and-challenges-in-mid-year-report-to-congress 
[https://perma.cc/ Z7NP-UG3G]; Jose Pagliery, IRS Taxpayer Data Theft Seven Times Larger than 
Originally Thought, CNN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/26/technology/irs-data-
theft/index.html [https://perma.cc/5Q6E-FH9P]; Hillary Clinton, A Fair Tax System, HILLARY 
CLINTON (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/a-fair-tax-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EYH-B6K2] (“[r]estore basic fairness to our tax code” and “[s]implify and cut 
taxes for small businesses”); Donald Trump, Tax Reform that Will Make America Great Again, 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/ tax-reform [https://perma.cc/Y6NV-74AR] (calling for 
“simpler, fairer brackets” that will “spur economic growth”). The TaxProf Blog was on Day 1563 of 
“The IRS Scandal” as of Aug. 19, 2017. Paul L. Caron, TAXPROF BLOG, 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/irs-scandal/ [https://perma. cc/248D-S3Q3]. 
2. See Bryan Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1673, 1682 (2014); Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax 
Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 21, 21 (2014); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution 
Should Determine Whether an Agency’s Explanation of a Tax Decision Is Adequate?: A Response 
to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2014); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit 
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This tension plays out in cases that would shoehorn tax guidance into 
the mold created by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 The APA 
“afford[s] parties affected by administrative powers a means of knowing 
what their rights are and how they may be protected.”4 Unless 
specifically carved out, all agencies that create informal guidance, as 
opposed to formal rulemaking, are required to follow a procedure laid 
out in the APA popularly referred to as notice-and-comment.5 An 
agency is required to provide the affected public with notice of proposed 
rules and consider the public’s comments after a reasonable comment 
period. 
The Treasury Department often summarily relies on statutory 
exceptions from the requirement for notice-and-comment when it issues 
tax guidance.6 Since 2011, when the Supreme Court warned in Mayo 
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States7 that the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will not be granted special exemption 
from administrative law, this reliance has come under attack.8 This is 
part of a wave of attacks against Treasury Department procedures that 
                                                     
Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1901 (2014). See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon, 
The Perfect Process Is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA. 
TAX REV. 553 (2016); James Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067 (2015). 
3. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 70-404, 60 Stat. 237. For cases on the 
matter handed down in the last ten years, see Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 562 U.S. 46 (2011); Intermountain Ins. Serv. v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010); Stobie Creek 
Inv. LLC v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 636, 668 (2008); Lewis v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 48, 53–54 
(2007); Complaint, Chamber of Commerce v. I.R.S., No. 1:16-cv-944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016). 
4. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 193 (1945); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946). 
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
6. More than forty percent of the 232 regulations published between January 1, 2003 and 
December 31, 2005 are susceptible to APA challenge for failure to comply with the notice and 
comment. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1740–59 
(2007). 
7. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
8. See id.; Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax 
Reform, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 917 (2012); Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1153, 1778–86 (2008); Michael Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 365, 384–84, 387 (1998); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of 
Federal Tax Regulators, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1987). See generally Kristin E. Hickman, 
Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2010); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006); Kristin E. 
Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013); Steven R. Johnson, 
Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the May Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269 (2012); Leandra 
Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 643 (2012); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 
1 (2013); Kristin E. Hickman, Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, 12 ENGAGE 1 (2011), http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/goodbye-tax-exceptionalism [https://perma.cc/M4Q4-DHNX]. 
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are argued not to comply with the APA. As a result, what APA 
compliance looks like in the tax context has been a hot topic. Despite a 
need for clarity of the law, courts have yet to establish a coherent 
jurisprudence on this issue.9 
In other areas of law, agencies often litigate the application of the 
APA to their guidance before the guidance is enforced against the 
public.10 Pre-enforcement litigation can isolate procedural issues and 
allow the public thereafter to focus on the substance of the rules as it 
applies to their facts. This process is not currently available in the tax 
context because of statutory and prudential prohibitions on pre-
enforcement litigation on either substantive or procedural grounds.11 
Most challenges to tax guidance and the collection of tax are deferred 
until after a taxpayer is audited, is found to owe tax, and completes the 
agency’s appeals process. These tax specific and general prudential 
doctrines minimize the number and type of attacks the Treasury 
Department faces even when the APA would otherwise permit the 
challenge. 
Only those taxpayers who are found to be in violation of the tax 
guidance and who do not settle with the IRS have any ability to initiate a 
judicial challenge of the guidance’s procedural history. In most 
instances, this potential tax litigation results from either refund or 
deficiency suits. Refund litigation occurs when a taxpayer has paid taxes 
or penalties and seeks to recover these payments.12 Deficiency litigation 
challenges an IRS audit that determines taxes are owed but are not yet 
paid.13 With a three-year statute of limitations for assessing liability, this 
litigation may take place years after the tax return was filed.14 Moreover, 
only those who pursue litigation after this period of delay can initiate 
procedural challenges—a small subset of all taxpayers. What most 
                                                     
9. See generally Balestra v. United States, 803 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussed in Part II); 
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 3 (2015). 
10. See Balestra, 803 F.3d 1363; discussion infra Part II. 
11. Judges could broaden the narrow exceptions so that some cases could be heard early. 
Hickman suggests revising judicial interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory 
Judgment Act “to allow some greater amount of . . . judicial review of facial challenges to Treasury 
regulations seems likely to resolve the problems . . .”; however, she recognizes that “a legislative 
solution may be necessary” if that is insufficient. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 
1201–02. However, even after doing so the bulk of tax guidance would remain insulated from pre-
enforcement juridical review. Moreover, the exceptions might increase taxpayer frustration and 
confusion over when they can and cannot secure judicial review. 
12. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2012).  
13. See id. §§ 6211(a), 6213(a), 6512(b). 
14. Id. § 6501(a). The statute of limitations is extended to six years for substantial omission and 
indefinitely if a return is filed fraudulently or no return is filed. Id. § 6501(c), (e). 
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taxpayers may gain in that litigation is unlikely to offset the expense of 
the litigation itself. 
While Congress only permits procedural challenges late in the tax 
collection process, this offers little to most taxpayers. The delay in 
litigating procedural complaints reduces what is challenged and affects 
taxpayer behavior throughout the period from its promulgation until 
someone, eventually, challenges the procedures. In the process, delayed 
litigation requires that taxpayers plan their affairs under the spectre of 
guidance that might not survive a procedural challenge. Moreover, in 
deciding whether to follow the tax guidance, taxpayers must not only 
assess its substance but also the procedures used to create it under 
procedural requirements that are not consistently interpreted by the 
courts. It is for these reasons this Article proposes two narrow statutory 
changes to permit pre-enforcement review of the procedures used to 
create tax guidance. 
Thus, this Article accepts the reality that courts will permit certain 
procedural challenges to tax guidance, and with that acceptance argues 
that a new method for hearing those challenges needs to be developed. 
The right to procedural litigation should mean something. Instead of 
waiting until after enforcement of the guidance, this Article proposes 
that procedural challenges should be heard early, to the extent 
constitutionally permissible. Thereafter, taxpayers may undertake their 
tax compliance understanding what the law is. However, permitting this 
early litigation is likely to increase the amount of litigation and its cost.15 
This cost requires constraining early and meaningful review so that it 
does not consume all of the agency’s resources. 
Unless the system balances permissive litigation with an awareness of 
limited agency resources, taxpayers have an incentive to overwhelm the 
agency in litigation. Today, as courts and academics struggle to 
determine exactly how application of the APA and notice-and-comment 
will change the process for challenging tax guidance, this litigation has 
been recognized as a means to change some tax outcomes. One Am-Law 
100 law firm claims procedural challenges create “a unique opportunity” 
to challenge the IRS and Treasury Department.16 That these procedural 
                                                     
15. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 185, 233–38 (1994). 
16. Sena Akins & Geral Kafka, Latham & Watkins LLP, A New Argument for Contesting IRS 
Audit Determinations, 65 Tax Executive 171, 179 (2013); see also Roger Jones et al., How to 
Challenge Tax Regs on Administrative Law Grounds, LAW 360 (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.law360. 
com/articles/715380/how-to-challenge-tax-regs-on-administrative-law-grounds [https://perma.cc/ 
L4QS-8DDF]; J. Walker Johnson & Alexis A. Maclvor, Tax Controversy Alert, STEPTOE & 
JOHNSON LLP, http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/4472.pdf [https://perma.cc/J39D-98WS]. 
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challenges to the validity of tax guidance generally occur in the post-
audit context risks breeding contempt for the tax system more than 
fixing procedural problems.17 Additionally, the structure of the litigation 
means that important procedural issues can never be brought in court. 
Therefore, some procedural problems will continue unless Congress 
steps in to protect taxpayer rights. 
This Article proposes legislative changes to address some of the 
problems created by post-audit procedural challenges; however, it is 
important to know what this Article does not argue. It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to debate the value of applying notice-and-comment 
in the creation of tax guidance. There are good reasons to facilitate the 
publication of guidance and to limit judicial review of agency 
procedures, both generally and specifically in the tax context.18 The 
IRS’s budget has been reduced by twelve percent over the last ten years 
when adjusted for inflation, and with the IRS’s shrinking budget, there is 
only so much that can be accomplished by an underfunded agency.19 
Increasing the amount of tax litigation for a greater number of 
procedural claims could have several unintended consequences, 
including impeding other agency activities that might be as important, if 
not more so, for the protection of taxpayers’ rights and reducing 
government revenue. In a world of finite resources, it should not be 
assumed that increasing an agency’s administrative burdens is in 
taxpayers’ best interest. 
Additionally, with the evolution of procedural litigation, it is possible 
that APA procedures will be required of all IRS and Tax Court activities; 
however, this Article limits itself to the creation of tax guidance.20 The 
focus on guidance is because of the importance of this issue in litigation 
today and because this study can serve as a model for how a narrow 
procedural fix can address concerns without opening the floodgates to 
litigation. In doing so, this Article urges temperance, rather than broad 
sweeping changes of unknown consequence, to the administration of the 
                                                     
Academics are telling the bar to do so. See Steve Johnson, Using Administrative Law to Challenge 
IRS Determinations, 88 FLA. B.J. 81 (2014). 
17. See infra Part I. 
18. See infra note 59. 
19. Jeremy H. Temkin, Internal Revenue Service Budget Cuts Spell Trouble, 253 N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 
22, 2015).  
20. For example, recent cases have questioned whether the IRS must comply with the APA 
when issuing determination letters assessing taxpayers’ liability or in IRS programs operated to 
increase compliance with foreign-held assets. See Maze v. IRS, 206 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2016); Reply 
Brief for Appellant, Qinetiq U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 845 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
2192), 2016 WL 1464112. 
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nation’s revenue raising regime. The most persuasive form of tax 
guidance is regulations, but there is also lesser guidance, such as revenue 
rulings and private letter rulings, that assist taxpayers in complying with 
the tax law. In this Article, the broader term, “tax guidance,” is used to 
encompass all types of agency-created rules governing tax matters. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly describes the APA’s 
procedures for agencies to create rules. The notice-and-comment rules 
are often considered onerous and to not perfectly accomplish their 
objectives. There are exceptions to these procedures, but courts interpret 
the exceptions narrowly.21 Part I also describes how tax guidance is 
created in comparison to the APA procedures. 
Part II then examines when the APA permits pre-enforcement 
litigation of procedural issues and how a general presumption in favor of 
pre-enforcement litigation does not extend to the tax context.22 Congress 
enacted specific statutory limitations that prevent taxpayers from 
challenging most tax laws and tax guidance before enforcement. 
Additionally, prudential rules limit the ability to bring lawsuits against 
the government more generally. These limits effectively overturn the 
APA’s default of early litigation over the procedures the APA requires 
and reduce the likelihood of pre-enforcement procedural challenges to 
tax guidance. 
In Part III, the Article examines how, under current law, some 
procedural matters are never litigated. First, no one is in a position to 
challenge rules that favor small groups of taxpayers. Only those 
benefited have standing to sue and they have little incentive to challenge 
their own benefit, if this is even possible. Additionally, notices that 
promise future regulations are likely not final rules for APA challenge or 
ripe for litigation.23 Unfortunately, there is a cost of these timing and 
scope of litigation limitations. Taxpayer rights and the law’s consistency 
are both jeopardized through delayed or limited litigation of procedural 
violations. 
Recognizing the importance of maintaining a workable tax system, 
Part IV proposes two narrow statutory changes to address these concerns 
about procedure. First, this Article proposes a statutory change to permit 
narrow procedural challenges to the validity of tax guidance before 
enforcement of the guidance is undertaken. The proposal permits 
                                                     
21. See infra Part I. 
22. See also Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8 (focusing on why people do not make 
APA claims in tax matters). 
23. Lawrence A. Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 
62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012). 
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litigation over substantive issues only to the extent necessary to clarify 
that the regulations are consistent with the statutory language. To ensure 
the Treasury Department and IRS are not inundated with procedural 
claims and that rules are finalized, a limited time period should be 
established to constrain when this type of procedural litigation can 
occur, as currently required by some other agencies’ rules. 
This permissive approach to pre-enforcement litigation would settle 
procedural issues and permit the law to proceed subject only to 
substantive challenge. Although this would prevent some taxpayers from 
making procedural challenges after learning too late of the application of 
the guidance to their own circumstances, this proposal balances concerns 
over taxpayer rights to challenge procedure with the need for settled 
guidance to shape taxpayer activity. In the process, it should also 
encourage more public attention to the guidance-making process. 
The second proposal expands the group that can engage in these legal 
challenges. To increase procedural review of favorable tax guidance, 
Congress should provide standing for those who do not benefit from tax 
expenditures by permitting “all persons” to sue over procedural claims. 
Moreover, Congress should acknowledge the injury that tax 
expenditures have on federal revenue and subsequently on the provision 
of national services. Because of the far-reaching consequences of 
narrowly tailored tax preferences beyond the immediate taxpayer, the 
procedures used for creating the guidance must be democratic. Failure to 
follow democratic procedures envisioned by the APA should be open to 
public challenge. 
The success of this second proposal depends upon the judicial 
response. Courts may not accept that this latter proposal proves that a 
case or controversy exists if they do not accept there is a real injury for 
those not benefited by tax preferences. If courts do not accept this 
congressional interpretation of the injury, neither those not benefited nor 
those who are benefited have an injury. Therefore, those opposing the 
procedure used to create the rule would only have recourse to Congress. 
Appeals to Congress, however, would likely address the substance of the 
rule and ignore procedural concerns. 
The Article concludes that changing the law in these limited ways has 
many benefits despite having some drawbacks. If Congress adopts these 
two changes, the public could litigate procedural questions without the 
necessity of being found to owe tax. This would validate the importance 
of procedural issues and encourage greater compliance with the APA by 
the Treasury Department. A limited window for those procedural 
complaints would encourage public participation in the creation of tax 
guidance when the ability to litigate remains open. Having early 
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litigation would then allow tax guidance to apply to taxpayers who may 
focus only on its substance. However, this proposal also means the IRS 
is likely to face a wave of new litigation and need to devote more of its 
dwindling resources to litigation. Despite this downside, in a world 
where procedural attacks will occur, litigating early maximizes benefits 
to both taxpayers and the government. 
I. PROCEDURAL CLAIMS AGAINST TAX GUIDANCE UNDER 
THE APA 
An agency does not have the discretion to develop rules using any 
method it chooses. Instead, Congress prescribes the procedures for 
creating rules in the APA, unless Congress expressly grants an agency 
an exception from the generally applicable requirements. These 
procedures were enacted in 1946, and since that time the rules have 
grown through judicial interpretation. Nevertheless, ambiguities remain 
and agencies must interpret the procedures for themselves as they craft 
their rules. These interpretations are then subject to review by courts. 
The Treasury Department is an agency subject to the APA unless an 
exception applies. Therefore, general APA procedures are the backdrop 
against which Treasury Department procedures are to be measured. 
Although the Treasury Department says it complies with the APA, the 
degree to which it does so has been debated. 
A. The APA’s Rules as a Backdrop for Tax Guidance 
The APA “afford[s] parties affected by administrative powers a 
means of knowing what their rights are and how they may be 
protected.”24 To that end, when agencies forego formal hearings to 
create rules, section 553 of the APA requires federal agencies to provide 
the public with notice of a proposed rule as well as an opportunity to 
comment on the proposal.25 The agency is then required to consider the 
public’s comments after a reasonable comment period before publishing 
the rule as final.26 Unless specifically carved out, all agencies that create 
guidance, including tax agencies, are required to follow this procedure, 
                                                     
24. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 193 (1945); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 250 (1946). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). For purposes of notice and comment procedures, a rule is defined 
broadly to encompass virtually any agency statement about what regulated parties must or should 
do. Id. § 551(4). 
26. The resulting rule must be published at least thirty days before it takes effect unless there is 
good cause for a sooner effective date. Id. § 553(d). 
09 - McMahon.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:22 AM 
1326 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1317 
 
popularly referred to as notice-and-comment. This process has many 
components that may be burdensome for agencies to satisfy. 
The primary purpose of notice-and-comment procedures is to ensure 
the public has a voice in the creation of the rules. Exception from these 
procedures are limited in order to maintain a robust dialogue between 
agencies and the public, but exceptions do exist to ensure other public 
interests are not sacrificed in the quest for public participation. Many 
contemporary attacks on the Treasury Department’s process for issuing 
tax guidance, regulations in particular, claim that the Department’s 
process fails to comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment 
requirements and does not fall within an exception.27 
The requirements of notice-and-comment are extensive. For example, 
notice is more than alerting the public to a proposed rule; it has many 
nuanced requirements. Notice must “fairly apprise interested parties of 
the issues involved in the proposed rule, so that [the public] may present 
responsive data or argument,”28 and the “required specification of legal 
authority must be done with particularity.”29 Courts treat this notice 
requirement seriously, invalidating rules that fail to provide sufficient 
factual details and rationales to permit the public a “fair chance” to 
comment meaningfully.30 Therefore, the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM), typically published in the Federal Register, must include the 
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved.31 An agency adding critical material to the record 
after the comment period risks judicial invalidation of the rule because 
the public did not have time to respond to that new material.32 
Notice opens the agency’s doors for any and all to submit comments 
with any information they choose to share. There is no requirement that 
the commentator be a party in a more litigious sense. And while the 
APA does not establish a window for the submission of comments, a 
                                                     
27. See supra note 3. 
28. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 200. 
29. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 258. 
30. See, e.g., Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 714 F.2d 1290, 1298 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (the Interstate Commerce Commission’s failure to articulate the legal basis for a rule 
“effectively deprived the petitioners of [the] opportunity to present comments”). 
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012); see also Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Portland Cement Ass’n v. 
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Penobscot Indian Nation v. U.S. Dep’t. of Housing & 
Urban Dev., 539 F. Supp. 2d 40, 50 (D.D.C. 2008). 
32. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 833 (5th Cir. 2010); Idaho Farm Bureau 
Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1402–04 (9th Cir. 1955). 
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reasonable amount of time must be provided.33 Agencies typically allow 
sixty days for comments.34 
Following the comment period, the agency must consider “the 
relevant matter presented” in the comments.35 The extent to which this 
exchange between the agency and the public becomes a dialogue is 
debated. For example, in Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal 
Communications Commission,36 the majority treated the agency and 
commentators as opposing litigants so that process itself was 
emphasized to assure fairness to the commentators.37 The dissent argued 
that the decision-making process should be reviewed in its entirety, in 
order to permit a long chain of public involvement to be evidence of 
compliance with the APA.38 This debate over procedural versus 
substantive participation permeates discussion of the value to be given to 
each section of the APA. 
The fundamental meaning of notice-and-comment is critical because 
an agency cannot substantially change a rule in response to comments 
without starting the notice-and-comment process over again. Only those 
changes that are a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule may be made 
without restarting the process for fear that the public did not have 
adequate notice or the opportunity to comment on the revised 
language.39 If, and only if, the public “should have anticipated” the 
change is it unnecessary to restart notice-and-comment.40 Any change 
that “materially alters the issues involved in the rulemaking” or 
substantially departs from the proposed language requires re-notice.41 An 
agency that fails to provide new notice-and-comment risks a court 
invalidating the rule based on procedural faults. 
Two cases illustrate some of the difficulties of the logical outgrowth 
test. In South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency,42 the 
agency modified a proposed rule that reduced pollution from motor 
                                                     
33. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
34. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 251–52, 272–74 
(5th ed. 2012). Agencies may accept late comments at their discretion. Id. at 252. 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
36. 652 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011). 
37. Id. at 445–47. 
38. Id. at 473 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
39. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 160 (2007); Nat. Res. Def. 
Council Inc. v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002). 
40. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
41. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985). 
42. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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vehicles by adopting specific measures, such as parking surcharges and 
travel restrictions.43 The final rule eliminated the proposed measures 
and, instead, imposed other measures, such as reducing parking 
availability and increasing automobile inspections.44 The First Circuit 
held the new measures were a logical outgrowth of the proposal because 
they were “in character with the original scheme” and the agency had 
announced in the notice that it would consider “all reasonable 
alternatives.”45 
On the other hand, in Chocolate Manufacturers Ass’n v. Block,46 the 
Department of Agriculture responded to a congressional amendment to 
the federal food program that required supplemental foods for women, 
infants, and children to have nutritional value.47 The Department 
proposed maintaining the substitution of flavored milk for whole milk 
but invited the public “to make recommendations for alternatives not 
considered in the proposed regulations.”48 The final regulation 
prohibited the substitution, and the Fourth Circuit held that in “the 
specific circumstances of this case” the revision was not a logical 
outgrowth because the Department had previously permitted the 
substitution and had not suggested deleting flavored milk.49 Therefore, in 
order to delete flavored milk, the agency was required to re-initiate the 
process, alerting the public to the proposed deletion. 
The risk of invalidation for failing to restart the notice-and-comment 
process leads to some degree of intellectual lock-in with proposed 
language. Practical considerations of the cost and timing of redoing 
notice-and-comment are in addition to people’s natural propensity not to 
change their minds, described in depth in the bounded rationality 
scholarship.50 This result caused Stephanie Stern to conclude that notice-
and-comment actually reduces the value of public participation by 
prematurely committing agencies to proposed rules.51 
                                                     
43. Id. at 656–57. 
44. Id. at 657–58. 
45. Id. at 658–59. 
46. 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985). 
47. Id. at 1100. 
48. Id. at 1101. 
49. Id. at 1107. 
50. See BOUNDED RATIONALITY (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2002); MANCUR 
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 124 (1965); Herbert A. Simon, Bounded 
Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 125 (1991).  
51. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 620–30 (2002); see also 
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1954–61 
(2008). 
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As a final step of notice-and-comment, the statute requires that final 
rules be submitted to the Federal Register with a concise general 
statement of its basis and purpose.52 Courts, however, have effectively 
eliminated “concise” from this APA requirement.53 In Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,54 the Supreme Court urged lower 
courts to engage in a “searching and careful” review of agency actions.55 
To facilitate that review, agencies must provide courts with a 
contemporaneous administrative record of their decision-making in their 
statements accompanying final rules.56 In later litigation over the 
procedure behind a rule, only those statements supplied with the final 
rule are reviewable in support of the agency.57 Consequently, agencies 
can use their own expertise to supplement the comments in their 
rulemaking, but that expertise must become part of the administrative 
record in a way accessible to the courts.58 
This exchange between the public and the agency is to encourage 
public participation in the rulemaking process. Subjecting proposed 
regulations to public scrutiny is expected to foster rational and informed 
rulemaking.59 However, the notice-and-comment procedures the APA 
imposes, which critics want to be applied more rigorously in the 
formation of tax guidance, do not always accomplish these goals and 
may inadvertently make it harder for agencies to move closer to the ideal 
by increasing the cost of issuing guidance. 
Some scholars argue these procedures have become onerous to 
agencies and reduce the amount of rules and guidance that are 
produced.60 Moreover, the level of review that is required for an agency 
rule to be upheld is not predictable; Jerry Mashaw argues that courts 
                                                     
52. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
53. See Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
54. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
55. Id. at 416. 
56. Id. at 420. 
57. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
58. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103–04 (1983); Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2005).  
59. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1028–31 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Int’l Harvester 
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
60. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 
(2012) (responding to Yackee & Yackee, infra); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the 
Administrative Procedure Act More Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003); Jason Webb 
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of 
Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012) (testing 
rulemaking at the Department of the Interior). 
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function as “robed roulette wheels” when reviewing agency guidance.61 
As a result, the notice-and-comment procedure is costly in terms of both 
time and agency resources, while the procedure does not guarantee the 
public good. 
Recognizing a downside of notice-and-comment, even the APA does 
not claim notice-and-comment must be applied in all circumstances. 
Because notice-and-comment procedures are not always in the public’s 
best interest, the APA’s exceptions ensure other public interests are not 
sacrificed in the quest for public participation. Some exceptions are 
specific subject matter exceptions for national priority circumstances—
military or foreign affairs—or for internal agency or government 
business—agency management, personnel, or public property, loans, 
grants, benefits, or contracts.62 These do not apply in the tax context 
discussed in this Article. 
More broadly, there is an exception for interpretive or procedural 
rules and general statements of public policy.63 These excepted rules do 
not have the force and effect of law, or alternatively, do not govern 
substantive rights.64 Instead, they offer guidance as to the agency’s 
interpretation of the law. In this way, interpretive guidance is the 
agency’s view of the law but not the agency’s creation of law. The 
existence of interpretive rules raises questions of the appropriate level of 
deference courts should give this type of guidance. Agencies’ authority 
even to issue interpretive regulations is questioned, in part, because 
distinguishing between interpretive and legislative rules is difficult for 
agencies and even courts to do. 
Finally, the APA recognizes an exception from notice-and-comment 
when agencies have good cause to do so.65 Unlike interpretive rules, 
rules created under the good cause exception have full force and effect 
of law. Although not widely applied by courts, the good cause exception 
                                                     
61. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 181 (1997); Wendy E. Wagner, 
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L. J. 1321, 1360 (2010).  
62. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012). 
63. Id. § 553(b)(A). 
64. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001); Christensen v. Harris 
County., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61–62 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244, 256–58 (1991); LUBBERS, supra note 34, at 64–77; Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17.  
65. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). There is a separate good cause exception to the standard thirty-
day waiting period following their publication before regulations become effective. Id. § 553(d); see 
also Riverbend Farms Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing differences 
between the good cause exception to the thirty-day waiting requirement and the good cause 
exception to notice and comment). 
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is authorized when compliance with the notice-and-comment procedure 
is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”66 
Therefore, regulations promulgated within this narrow exception avoid 
notice-and-comment but have a similar effect as guidance that has gone 
through notice-and-comment. This exception can be, at least at times, a 
large “legal grey hole” through which agencies avoid judicial review of 
agencies’ procedure in making law.67 
B. Tax Guidance’s Potential Violations 
The Treasury Department and the IRS, as a bureau within the 
Treasury Department, issue significant amounts of guidance that qualify 
as rules subject to the APA. Congress granted the Secretary of the 
Treasury Department, and subsequently the Secretary’s designees, the 
authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement” of the Code.68 Although most tax regulations proceed 
through the notice-and-comment process, few adhere to a strict form of 
notice-and-comment before their issuance. Currently, the Treasury 
Department often summarily relies on the interpretive or good cause 
exceptions for the issuance of tax guidance and sometimes issues legally 
binding temporary regulations simultaneously with proposed 
regulations, which then proceed through notice-and-comment.69 These 
procedures have come under legal and academic attack for failing to 
comply with proper procedure. 
One critique is over the Treasury Department’s policy of often 
simultaneously issuing proposed and temporary regulations, resulting in 
a delayed comment period until after publication of guidance that is 
binding.70 The Treasury Department issues proposed regulations that 
have completed internal review but still await public review at the same 
time it issues temporary regulations.71 These temporary regulations have 
                                                     
66. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). 
67. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1125 
(2009). 
68. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
69. See supra note 2. 
70. The Code requires the Treasury Department to issue proposed regulations when it issues 
temporary regulations, and proposed regulations presumably are subject to notice and comment. 
I.R.C. § 7805(e); see also I.R.M. § 32.1.1.2.2. 
71. Taxpayers cannot rely on proposed regulations to support a tax position or for planning 
purposes unless the IRS clearly states otherwise, and proposed regulations are not binding on the 
IRS, even though the IRS’s policy is to follow them. I.R.M. § 32.1.1.2.2; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 
CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003). 
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the same authority as final regulations that completed both internal and 
external review, despite rarely going through the notice-and-comment 
process.72 The speedy publication without public review subjects 
temporary regulations to criticism while making them popular with the 
Treasury Department.73 Although subject to debate, the Treasury 
Department’s modified form of notice-and-comment coupling temporary 
and proposed regulations is also used by other agencies.74 
The Treasury Department has argued, unsuccessfully, that Congress 
blessed this simultaneous issuance arrangement in the tax context.75 
Congress provided a three-year period of effectiveness for temporary tax 
regulations and required the simultaneous issuance of proposed 
regulations.76 The Treasury Department argued before the Tax Court that 
this was a political trade-off permitting the continued, short-term use of 
temporary regulations without notice-and-comment. If Congress 
intended the trade-off, that intent was not made evident. Congress did 
not make any purpose explicit in this situation as it has done in other 
contexts.77 
An argument the Treasury Department also frequently makes to 
bolster its procedure is that most of its regulations are interpretative and 
therefore do not require notice-and-comment.78 This is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
                                                     
72. Id.  
73. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 
44 TAX LAW 343, 364 (1991); Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 8, at 496 n.168; 
Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Regulations, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX 
L.J. 248, 253 (2003). See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Mark Thomson, Open Minds and 
Harmless Errors, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (2016); Steve Johnson, Intermountain and the 
Importance of Administrative Law in Tax Law, 128 TAX NOTES 837 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Intermountain]. The Treasury Department has issued a significant number of them since a backlog 
of statutes needing guidance was enacted in the 1980s. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 
supra note 8, at 498. In a study of 232 regulatory projects, from January 1, 2003 through December 
31, 2005, more than one-third were issued with only post-promulgation notice and comment. See 
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6, at 1748–51.  
74. Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 726 
(1999). Even the Administrative Conference of the United States endorsed the use of interim-final 
rules. Notice: Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111 (Aug. 18, 1995). 
75. See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010), rev’d on other 
grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
76. I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2012). 
77. Congress explicitly permitted post-promulgation comments for regulations regulating the 
Health Care Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 401(a), 110 Stat. 
1936, 2073 (codified at I.R.C. § 9833 (2012)). 
78. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012). 
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Ass’n79 that interpretive rules do not require notice-and-comment even if 
they significantly revise or change policies from a prior presidential 
administration.80 Despite the holding, three separate concurrences in 
Mortgage Bankers stated concern that interpretive regulations were 
subject to agency abuse.81 
The Treasury Department sources regulations to the authority for the 
regulation and claims this sourcing justifies its expansive use of 
interpretive regulations. Regulations can be initiated under any provision 
of the Internal Revenue Code, but the Treasury Department interprets 
the catchall provision that grants the Treasury Department the power to 
issue “all needful rules and regulations” as the source of interpretive 
regulations.82 Under this interpretation, the IRS believes that regulations 
only require notice-and-comment because they are legislative 
regulations when they originate from specific authority in a particular 
Code provision.83 The Treasury Department claimed more than ninety 
percent of temporary regulations were interpretive and that public 
comment was not required.84 
This distinction between interpretive and legislative regulations may 
be invalid under administrative law.85 Most other agencies recognize all 
regulations as legislative.86 Focusing on the potential penalties taxpayers 
face if they fail to follow interpretive tax regulations, Kristin Hickman 
argues the distinction reflects a historical understanding no longer 
consistent with changes in administrative law doctrine.87 According to 
this argument, all tax regulations except those issued under the good 
cause exception would need more arduous public review. 
Congress is aware that the Treasury Department retains this 
distinction between authorities and procedures. For example, pursuant to 
the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis Act (RFAA), agencies must analyze 
the impact of proposed rules on small businesses.88 The RFAA’s 
requirement generally applies only to rules that go through notice-and-
comment, a process the Treasury Department contends only applies to 
                                                     
79. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
80. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206. 
81. Id. at 1210–25. 
82. I.R.M. § 32.1.2.8. 
83. Id. 
84. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6, at 1748–51. 
85. Asimow, supra note 73, at 358. See generally Johnson, Intermountain, supra note 73. 
86. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, supra note 8, at 520. 
87. Id. 
88. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2012). 
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specific authority legislative regulations. Congress added a special 
requirement applicable only to tax to include interpretive rules as well as 
legislative ones.89 In the limited context of the RFAA, Congress 
recognized that the Treasury Department makes a distinction and 
eliminated its effect without eliminating the distinction itself. 
Additionally, the IRS issues a tremendous amount of tax guidance 
that receives less review than is given to regulations. Revenue Rulings 
apply the law to particular factual situations. Revenue Procedures are 
similar to Revenue Rulings but traditionally focus on procedural, rather 
than substantive, aspects of the tax system. Public notices are equivalent 
to rulings, but their value is derived from the fact they can be issued 
more quickly in response to public concerns.90 Less general are Private 
Letter Rulings issued to particular taxpayers seeking binding guidance 
for proposed transactions and numerous types of guidance issued to IRS 
agents in the process of audits or on particular matters. These other 
forms of guidance are made public as a result of the Freedom of 
Information Act.91 
There are claims that the Treasury Department and IRS fail to meet 
the APA’s procedural requirements for the creation of regulations and 
these other forms of guidance. That failure is arguably subject to judicial 
challenge and invalidation. To the extent the Treasury Department and 
IRS are subject to the APA, they must meet its procedural requirements, 
even if the requirements are burdensome and may operate against the 
public’s best interests. The question for the next Part is how the failure 
to follow proper procedure may be challenged. 
II. CURRENT LIMITATIONS ON PRE-ENFORCEMENT TAX 
ATTACKS 
In most instances the APA permits pre-enforcement litigation to 
ensure final rules comply with the Act’s procedural requirements before 
the rules have far-reaching impact. In the tax context, however, specific 
statutes carve out procedural issues (as well as substantive ones) from 
litigation before the rules have been enforced against a particular 
taxpayer. Additionally, traditional prudential justiciability rules prevent 
                                                     
89. Id. (the requirement applies to a general notice of proposed rulemaking or a “notice of 
proposed rulemaking . . . for an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue laws of the United 
States”). 
90. Rev. Rul. 87-138, 1987-2 C.B. 287. 
91. John Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 79–89 (1995). 
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many people from litigating procedural issues regarding tax guidance. 
There were, and remain, good reasons for imposing these restrictive 
policies, but there are also costs of doing so. The need to use efficiently 
judicial and agency resources and the interests of taxpayers and the 
public often conflict in the midst of these challenges. 
A. APA Default Favors Pre-Enforcement Litigation 
Section 701 of the APA establishes a presumption in favor of judicial 
review of agency action.92 Only to the extent that “statutes preclude 
judicial review” or the action is “committed to agency discretion by law” 
are courts to abstain from evaluating the choices that agencies make.93 
Thus, generally only express congressional action eliminates judicial 
review of agency rulemaking. This broad pro-litigation floor does not, 
however, open up all issues to litigation at all times. The APA provides 
rules to guide a generally permissive pre-enforcement litigation process 
that encourages early evaluation of procedural, and other, claims. 
Courts accept that the APA encourages litigation unless Congress 
expressly says otherwise or, alternately, in those rare instances where 
“statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no 
law to apply.”94 Courts often narrowly interpret statutory language that 
might limit judicial review.95 In Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. 
Volpe,96 the Supreme Court found there was “law to apply” when the 
law said the Department of Transportation was not to build highways 
through parks if a “feasible and prudent” alternative existed.97 The Court 
ruled the choice of going through a park was subject to judicial review 
                                                     
92. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Other statutory rules and executive orders, outside the 
APA, also limit agency discretion in creating rules, but compliance with these requirements is not 
reviewable by courts. For example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Executive Order 
12,866 work to improve management within the federal government and are not intended “to create 
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any person in any judicial or 
administrative action.” 2 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2012); Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,744 
(Oct. 4, 1993). Therefore, agencies cannot be sued for the violation of these requirements, although 
it might affect their future funding and congressional or executive support. 
93. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2). 
94. S. REP. NO. 752, at 212 (1945). For example, in Carolina Med. Sales, Inc. v. Leavitt, 559 F. 
Supp. 2d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2008), the court precluded judicial review on the grounds the provision in 
the law regarding the “selection of items and services for competitive acquisition” specifically 
insulated the decision from the courts.  
95. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 674 (1986). But see Block v. 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). 
96. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
97. Id. at 413. 
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because there was no indication that Congress sought to limit the APA’s 
judicial review. Congress must indicate with a “showing of ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ of a . . . legislative intent . . . [to] restrict access to 
judicial review.”98 
That pro-litigation perspective includes review of agency procedure 
often requiring notice-and-comment as discussed in the prior Part. This 
litigation may result in the court invalidating a rule if the agency acts 
“without observance of procedure required by law.”99 When an agency 
fails to comply with the APA’s requirements, as alleged for violations of 
the notice-and-comment process, a court may conclude this warrants 
invalidation of the rule. There is a “harmless error rule” in the 
application of this judicial review, so that if a violation does not create 
hardship, the court will not overturn the violation.100 However, “an utter 
failure to comply with notice and comment cannot be considered 
harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that 
failure.”101 
Despite a pro-litigation perspective, there are limits on when 
procedural claims can be brought under the APA. Cases alleging 
violations of the APA in the creation of rules cannot arise until the rules 
are “final.”102 This requirement protects the integrity of the 
administrative process and prevents wasting judicial resources. The 
Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear103 set the test: 
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency 
action to be “final”: First, the action must mark the 
“consummation” of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it 
must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And 
second, the action must be one by which “rights or obligations 
have been determined,” or from which “legal consequences will 
flow.”104 
This requirement makes it difficult to challenge a policy statement or 
a notice calling for further action. True policy statements may lack the 
requisite force of law to determine rights or obligations or lead to legal 
                                                     
98. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). 
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (2012). 
100. Id. 
101. Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
102. For more on the confusing law that is finality, see Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of 
Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371 (2008). 
103. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
104. Id. at 177–78 (citation omitted).  
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consequences.105 Nevertheless, the form of the guidance itself is not 
definitive as to whether the rule is final.106 Guidance has been held not 
final, so not subject to judicial review, despite having completed notice-
and-comment.107 
However, recently the Supreme Court has defined final agency action 
permissively to permit judicial review. In U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
v. Hawkes Co.,108 the Court held that a determination that the property 
on which a company sought to mine contained regulated water was the 
consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and, therefore, 
was a final rule permitting judicial review.109 That the determination 
could be revised based on new information did not make the 
determination less final. The Court would not require the plaintiff to 
await enforcement and risk “serious criminal and civil penalties” from a 
violation in order to challenge the determination.110 
Litigation is also potentially limited by the fact that not everyone can 
bring suit alleging a violation of the APA’s procedures. The litigation 
must meet the requirements of a “case or controversy” in Article III of 
the United States Constitution, discussed below. Additionally, suits may 
only be begun by a “person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute . . . .”111 “Agency action” is defined to 
include “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, 
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act . . . .”112 
Therefore, with respect to guidance, someone must be harmed, 
“adversely affected or aggrieved” by an agency’s rule or, possibly, 
failure to issue a rule. To this end, a discrete-action limitation precludes 
broad programmatic attacks, such as the one rejected in Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation,113 in which the Court would not permit a 
                                                     
105. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 226 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
106. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698–702 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
107. See New Jersey v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 526 F.3d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 2008). 
108. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). 
109. Id. at 1813; see also Sackett v. EPA, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). 
110. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016). 
111. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
112. Id. § 551(13). 
113. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
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wildlife group’s challenge to “seek wholesale improvement” of a broad-
based land use program.114 
Courts may also decide that issues may not be litigated if they were 
not first raised in the notice-and-comment process, if that process was 
used, and may limit the extent of the challenge.115 This limit applies 
regardless of the import of a particular issue; an issue generally must be 
first raised during the rulemaking process or else it is waived. In other 
words, petitioners must first exhaust their administrative avenues before 
proceeding to the courts even when the “failure is understandable.”116 
This encourages participation in the rulemaking process, something 
beneficial to the creation of all rules, including tax rules. 
Unlike the rules regarding who can bring challenges and when those 
challenges can be brought, enabling statutes generally determine the 
forum of judicial review of agency rules. Most enabling statutes 
containing judicial review provisions call for direct, pre-enforcement 
review in circuit courts as opposed to district courts, with a notable 
exception of the National Labor Relations Board.117 The Administrative 
Conference recommended appeals to one of the courts of appeals when 
(1) the rule is sufficiently significant that a district court decision would 
likely be appealed or (2) the “public interest requires prompt, 
authoritative determination of the validity of the rule.”118 The federal 
district and circuit courts are less common avenues in the tax context as 
most cases are litigated in the Tax Court, which permits tax litigation 
after enforcement but before the payment of the taxes owed.119 
Courts debate the justiciability of an alleged APA violation and not 
the agency’s enabling act. They generally hold that the APA is not an 
independent basis of jurisdiction.120 When there is no specifically 
applicable judicial review provision under the agency’s enabling statute, 
the petitioner should seek review in a district court through one of the 
                                                     
114. Id. at 891 (emphasis in original). 
115. See City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
116. Small Bus. in Telecomms. v. FCC, 251 F.3d 1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
117. The Administrative Orders Review Act applies to limited agencies, not including the 
Treasury Department, and provides for review in the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012); see 
also LUBBERS, supra note 34, at 391. 
118. ACUS Recommendation 75-3, The Choice of Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,926, 27,926–27 (July 2, 1975). 
119. I.R.S., DATA BOOK 63 tbl.27 (2015); see also I.R.C. § 7422 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1) 
(2012); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958). 
120. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–07 (1977). In tax, jurisdiction for refunds is 
given to the federal district courts and United States Court of Federal Claims in 28 U.S.C. § 1346 
(2012), and jurisdiction is given to the Tax Court in I.R.C. § 7442 (2012). 
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general jurisdictional statutes. The most frequently cited provision is the 
federal question provision, which grants district courts “original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”121 Under this claim there is no 
jurisdictional amount requirement. 
The jurisdictional basis can raise questions of when a case may be 
heard. For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,122 the FDA’s 
enabling statute did not grant pre-enforcement review, but the Supreme 
Court permitted the litigation.123 The issue arose over certain drug 
labeling, and the Court permitted the case to proceed on the basis that 
there was “no evidence at all that members of Congress meant to 
preclude traditional avenues of judicial relief,” and the rules would have 
an immediate and direct impact on manufacturers.124 The early challenge 
prevented the manufacturers from having to violate the rules and wait 
for enforcement. Since Abbott Laboratories, courts generally permit pre-
enforcement review of regulations.125 Often temporary relief is requested 
until the issue is heard by a court and will likely be granted if the court 
finds the rule has immediate and important effects on businesses.126 
Although Abbott Laboratories has reduced agencies’ ability to use 
ripeness as a defense against pre-enforcement litigation, the argument 
has not disappeared. In a companion case to Abbott Laboratories, Toilet 
Goods Ass’n v. Gardner,127 the Court denied pre-enforcement review of 
an FDA rule because it was not ripe, using the prudential rules to deny 
hearing despite it being permitted under the APA.128 Although the 
regulation allowing the Commissioner to suspend the certification of 
additives when their manufacturer refused access to inspectors was final 
and a legal issue, there was no clear immediate or irreparable impact.129 
The rule would only apply if access was denied and action was 
undertaken. At that time, the facts of the situation would be important. 
Thus, relief is less likely if a court finds there is no immediate impact on 
the business. 
                                                     
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
122. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
123. Id. at 142, 152. 
124. Id. at 142.  
125. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 13.2 (2016); RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7.3 (4th ed. 2004). 
126. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). 
127. 387 U.S. 158 (1967). 
128. Id. at 162–64. For more on ripeness, see infra section II.C. 
129. Id. at 162–64. 
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The existence of APA challenges may have greater impact on the 
agency and on taxpayers depending upon the standard courts use to 
evaluate the perceived procedural violation. However, the standards for 
reviewing perceived violations of the APA’s procedures are uncertain. 
The APA provides that the reviewing court will “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” or “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action” if certain findings are made.130 In particular, if the 
agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law” or “without observance of 
procedure required by law” the rule is in violation of the APA.131 
Extending beyond substantive issues, a catch-all provision requires 
agencies to not act arbitrarily and capriciously in their rule-making, 
“picking up administrative misconduct not covered by the other more 
specific paragraphs.”132 Thus, the arbitrary and capricious test is the 
traditional standard applied by courts for reviewing agency actions. 
Courts tend to focus on the following: whether the record supports the 
factual conclusion on which the rule is based; the rationality or 
reasonableness of the policy conclusions underlying the rule; and the 
extent to which the agency has adequately articulated the basis for its 
conclusions. 
Much of administrative law litigation applying the arbitrary and 
capricious standard focuses on the substance of agency rules but 
encompasses the procedures behind formation of the rule. Courts 
question whether the agency has satisfactorily come to its substantive 
conclusion through adherence to proper procedure. Reviewing courts’ 
interpretation of this standard has changed over time, sometimes 
depends on the judge, and often depends upon the subject matter and the 
perceived seriousness of the issue.133 The standard is both intrusive and 
deferential. Some have argued that any distinction between arbitrary and 
capricious, and other standards, at least the substantial evidence 
standard, is “largely semantic.”134 David Zaring concludes that courts 
use basic reasonableness criteria in each of the standards used to 
evaluate agency actions.135 
                                                     
130. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
131. Id. § 706(2)(A), (D). 
132. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
133. See Paul R. Verkuil et al., Special Feature, A Blackletter Statement of Federal 
Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2002). 
134. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684 (citations omitted).  
135. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010); see also Richard Pierce, 
 
09 - McMahon.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:22 AM 
2017] PRE-ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION NEEDED 1341 
 
For example, in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,136 the Supreme Court held that the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s evaluation of the environmental effects of a 
nuclear power plant’s fuel cycle was a prediction “within its area of 
special expertise, at the frontiers of science” so that the reviewing court 
“must generally be at its most deferential” in its review of this type of 
scientific conclusion.137 As long as the agency’s assumptions were 
“within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking,” and the agency 
“considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made,” the Court was not to 
second-guess the conclusion.138 
On the other hand, in the same term the Court decided Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.139 
In State Farm, which involved the rescission of a rule requiring passive 
restraints in new cars, the Court held that the Court was “not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency”: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if 
the agency has relied on factors Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise.140 
The reasoned justification demanded in State Farm requires courts 
take a hard look to ensure an agency has adequately considered all 
comments and that the agency has adequately supported its contested 
assumptions. Courts undertake this review after-the-fact. Only once the 
agency successfully proves it has considered all comments is the court to 
exercise constraint and uphold the agency’s action.141 
This test for evaluating whether there is a violation of APA 
procedures in pre-enforcement litigation is significantly tougher on the 
agency when courts apply the State Farm hard look review. Under the 
hard look review, courts are required to examine the administrative 
                                                     
Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 95–96 
(2011). 
136. 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
137. Id. at 103.  
138. Id. at 104–05. 
139. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
140. Id. at 43. 
141. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–51 (1970). 
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record created at the time of the promulgation of the final guidance and 
any explanatory materials accompanying the guidance. From that data, 
courts review the methodology, the criteria applied, the relevant factors 
and options considered, and the explanation of all of these items.142 
When a court finds that the creation of a rule violates APA 
procedures, the normal response is to remand the rule to the agency.143 
Agencies can often retain parts, or even all, of a remanded rule. Of the 
D.C. Circuit’s sixty-one remands of legislative rules between 1985 and 
1996, in only twelve did the agency not recover from the remand.144 
Thus, in most instances, through the remand procedure, agencies are 
able to promulgate similar rules but using correct APA procedure. 
During the period of remand, the court can choose whether or not to 
vacate the remanded rule. With vacatur, the rule that was promulgated 
through inappropriate procedures is no longer binding.145 Daniel 
Rodriguez argues that remand without vacatur is used “to temper the 
draconian impact of hard look review,” but, in the process, “it facilitates 
the use of more aggressive judicial scrutiny” by offering this means of 
softening the judgment.146 
Some judges use their discretion as to the choice of approach in any 
given case, and many judges consider the damage to the public interest 
from setting aside the rule before doing so.147 However, other judges do 
not accept that the statute provides this discretion. They interpret the 
language of the APA as requiring they vacate the rule because section 
706(2)(A) provides that a reviewing court confronted with a 
procedurally invalid rule shall “hold unlawful and set aside” the rule.148 
This is a minority position, and most rules are not vacated.149 In twenty-
                                                     
142. Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
525, 527 (1997). 
143. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
144. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 418 (2000). 
145. For evaluation of the vacatur, see Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 
(2003) (defending remand without vacatur as act of discretion); Boris Bershteyn, Note, An Article I, 
Section 7 Perspective on Administrative Law Remedies, 114 YALE L.J. 359 (2004) (using public 
choice to support vacatur); Kristina Daugirda, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (2005) (arguing that remand without vacatur is justified where costs of vacating 
are particularly high). 
146. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Gift Horses and Great Expectations, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 
(2004). 
147. See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Int’l 
Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 966–67 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
148. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 491–93 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., dissenting). 
149. See Jordan, supra note 144, at 410. 
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eight of sixty-one studied cases, William Jordan found the D.C. Circuit 
did not even explicitly state whether the rule was vacated on the 
assumption it would not be.150 
Thus, the APA generally permits pre-enforcement litigation of 
agencies’ procedural violations in the creation of rules. However, this 
permission is not universal, and the likelihood that a court will remand a 
rule for a violation is uncertain in any given instance. Nevertheless, the 
APA does provide a tool for those affected by agency action to ensure 
procedures are applied fairly. That agencies know they may be subject to 
challenge likely increases their respect of process in their activities. With 
historically little judicial oversight in the tax context, there is less of an 
external constraint on the Treasury Department’s actions. One study 
found that over forty percent of tax regulations were developed without 
following the traditional notice-and-comment procedure, most of those 
without stating the basis for failing to do so.151 Pre-enforcement 
litigation would likely mitigate this failure. 
B. Statutory Limitations 
Although the APA applies to the Treasury Department and the IRS, 
its general preference for pre-enforcement litigation is not the norm in 
tax because of longstanding specific statutory prohibitions. Neither the 
assessment of tax nor its collection can be challenged before 
enforcement actions have been undertaken because of the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act152 and an exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act.153 
As specific statutory enactments, these statutes trump the APA as a 
general statute. These acts ensure that the tax system operates with 
minimal litigation except as the law applies to specific taxpayers. 
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act are often 
interpreted coextensively, although they target different forms of relief 
that a court could grant.154 The Anti-Injunction Act, now in section 7421 
                                                     
150. Id. at 410, n.88. 
151. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6, at 1749–50. 
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
153. I.R.C. § 7421 (2012). There are narrow statutory exceptions provided in each act. For 
example, taxpayers can seek Tax Court review of determinations whether they are employees for 
employment tax purposes. Other provisions grant relief pre-enforcement. For example, I.R.C. 
section 7476(a) and I.R.C. section 7478 permits taxpayers to have Tax Court review of 
determinations regarding qualification of retirement plans or applicability of state and local bonds.  
154. See, e.g., Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004); Sigmon Coal Co. 
v. Apfel, 226 F.3d. 291, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2000). “[T]he federal tax exception to the Declaratory 
Judgment Act is at least as broad as the prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act.” Alexander v. “Ams. 
United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n.10 (1974). The Tax Anti-Injunction Act should not be confused 
 
09 - McMahon.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:22 AM 
1344 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1317 
 
of the Internal Revenue Code, denies injunctive relief by generally 
disallowing “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax [to] be maintained in any court by any person, 
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.”155 The Declaratory Judgment Act contains a broader tax 
exception that prevents courts from providing declaratory relief for 
controversies “with respect to Federal taxes.”156 
Courts have normally interpreted these provisions broadly, and the 
Supreme Court has declared that the Anti-Injunction Act was to result in 
“a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference” in the realm of 
taxation.157 Therefore, injunction and declaratory judgment litigation 
over tax issues is frequent but rarely successful.158 Kristin Hickman 
notes that most cases barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory 
Judgment Act are “unsurprising applications” against tax protesters 
“raising frivolous legal arguments already rejected by the courts” or 
those “asserting technicalities to avoid levies or property seizures for 
taxes clearly owed.”159 But even when issues are framed as 
constitutional challenges, “the courts have declined to adopt a general 
exception from I.R.C. § 7421 [the Anti-Injunction Act] and the DJA 
[Declaratory Judgment Act], concluding (probably rightly) that such an 
exception would quickly swallow the rule.”160 
There are two limited common law exceptions to the Anti-Injunction 
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act that permit pre-enforcement tax 
litigation. First, in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,161 a 
unanimous Supreme Court established a rule permitting pre-enforcement 
                                                     
with the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012), first enacted in 1793, which limits the ways 
federal courts can enjoin state court proceedings.  
155. I.R.C. § 7421 (2012). 
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).  
157. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Hickman, A Problem of 
Remedy, supra note 8, at 1169. 
158. See Paul H. Asofsky, Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Federal Tax 
Controversies, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 785, 786 (1975). 
159. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1166–67. 
160. The Supreme Court has identified a revenue-raising function as a justification for these 
limitations, with recourse in a suit for a refund. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 
370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1166–67. Neither 
provision’s legislative history provides much evidence of congressional intent, although the 
common law antecedent similarly precluded courts of equity from interfering with tax collection. 
Asofsky, supra note 158, at 787–88; Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1166–67; 
Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 109, 109 (1935).  
161. 370 U.S. 1 (1962). 
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litigation if “it is clear that in no circumstances could the Government 
ultimately prevail” and, in addition, “the taxpayer would suffer 
irreparable injury if collection were effected.”162 This may be an 
impossibly high threshold. 
The issue in Williams Packing was whether a company was the 
employer of its boats’ crews and therefore liable for employment taxes. 
The company furnished boats to captains who hired their own crews but 
who then sold their fish to the company. The lower courts found an 
irreparable injury permitting jurisdiction because the company would be 
forced into bankruptcy if it had to pay the taxes before requesting a 
refund. Despite establishing the test for when jurisdiction would be 
available, the Court held jurisdiction was barred in Williams Packing. 
This company could not have pre-enforcement review because the 
government’s claim was “not without foundation” when using the “most 
liberal view of the law and the facts.”163 If the Court had to go to the 
merits because there was the possibility of government success, it would 
contravene the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act. 
Williams Packing added a prong to the earlier, more lenient approach 
adopted in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.164 In Standard Nut, the 
Court had permitted “extraordinary and exceptional circumstances” to 
establish equitable relief to justify pre-enforcement review despite the 
Anti-Injunction Act.165 In that case, the IRS told Standard Nut that the 
company was immune to an excise tax on oleomargarine based on a 
precedent that established margarine was not subject to the tax.166 The 
IRS then reversed its position and tried to collect the tax.167 The Court 
held that the discriminatory enforcement of the tax against Standard Nut 
but not its competitors plus the company’s financial losses during the 
litigation provided a basis for equity jurisdiction.168 Going forward, 
application of this more lenient standard “virtually negated the Anti-
Injunction Act” and did “violence to the plain words of the statute.”169 
Williams Packing eliminated this lenient policy and shifted focus to the 
merits of the claim. 
                                                     
162. Id. at 7. 
163. Id. at 7–8. 
164. 284 U.S. 498 (1932); see also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922). 
165. 284 U.S. at 510. 
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
168. Id.  
169. Asofsky, supra note 158, at 792; Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 622–23 (1985). 
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The Supreme Court has since concluded that “Williams Packing was 
the ‘capstone’ of judicial construction” of the Anti-Injunction Act.170 
Relying on the requirement that the government not have any chance of 
winning, in United States v. American Friends Service Committee,171 the 
Court refused to hear a case regarding a pre-enforcement challenge to 
withholding.172 Recognizing that requiring these taxpayers to sue for a 
refund of withheld taxes would frustrate their chosen method for 
demonstrating religious opposition to the Vietnam War and that there 
were other ways the government could collect the tax, the Court still 
applied the Anti-Injunction Act.173 The Court reinforced its desire to 
“end [the] cyclical departures from the Act’s plain meaning.”174 
To satisfy the first prong of the Williams Packing test, the case must 
egregiously operate against the government. It must be “apparent that, 
under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States 
cannot establish its claim . . . .”175 The Court of Appeals held in a later 
case that the IRS must “flout[] the express terms of the Code, or lack[] 
any factual basis for the assessment of taxes against an individual 
taxpayer.”176 The taxpayer must prove that the government could not 
win under any circumstances, a high burden indeed.177 In the case of 
Investment Annuity Inc. v. Blumenthal,178 the D.C. District Court would 
not permit review of an IRS revenue ruling that investment annuity 
contracts were not eligible for favorable treatment, despite this making 
the matter never reviewable by a court. According to the court, the Anti-
Injunction Act would only have to yield “when the denial of judicial 
review rises to the level of a constitutional infirmity.”179 
To satisfy the second prong, the taxpayer must suffer irreparable harm 
from being denied relief. Unlike in the earlier Standard Nut, this is not a 
test of the taxpayer’s individual situation but whether relief is ever 
granted under law. Effectively nullifying this exception, a taxpayer’s 
opportunity to sue for a refund generally negates the irreparable 
                                                     
170. United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. 419 U.S. 7, 9–10 (1974). 
171. 419 U.S. 7 (1974). 
172. Id. at 9–10. 
173. Id.  
174. Id. 
175. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). 
176. Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  
177. But see Comm’r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 631–32 (1976). 
178. 609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
179. Inv. Annuity, 609 F.2d at 6.  
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injury.180 Unsurprisingly, courts rarely apply Williams Packing to find 
jurisdiction.181 
A second exception permitting pre-enforcement litigation despite the 
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act was established in 
South Carolina v. Regan.182 This exception permits review when there is 
no other legal remedy available. In Regan, the state of South Carolina 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief when the IRS denied interest on 
its state bonds and exclusion from holders’ gross income.183 South 
Carolina argued it could not seek a refund as it was not the affected 
taxpayer.184 The Court concluded there was no other legal remedy 
available.185 This exception is often narrowly construed.186 
Similar to Regan, cases that involve increasing other people’s taxes 
might not be limited by the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory 
Judgment Act. In McGlotten v. Connally,187 a black man denied 
membership in a fraternal lodge because of his race was permitted to 
bring a class action to enjoin the Treasury Department from granting tax 
benefits to racially discriminatory groups.188 The lower court held that 
the action has “nothing to do with the collection or assessment of taxes” 
and the plaintiff is unable to raise “his objections in a suit of refund.”189 
                                                     
180. United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. 419 U.S. 1, 11 (1974); Alexander v. “Ams. 
United,” Inc. 416 U.S. 752, 761–62 (1974). But see Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
181. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1171; see also Estate of Michal v. Lullo, 
173 F.3d 503, 506–07, 512 (4th Cir. 1999); Lampert v. United States, No. 87-2421, 1989 WL 
104459, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989); Ponchik v. Comm’r, 854 F.2d 1127, 1131–32 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
182. 465 U.S. 367 (1984). 
183. I.R.C. § 103 (2012); Regan, 465 U.S. at 372. 
184. Regan, 465 U.S. at 379–80. 
185. Id. 
186. Ryo Mach., LLC v. Dep’t of Treasury, 696 F.3d 467, 472–73 (6th Cir. 2012); SEC v. 
Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 297 F.3d 127, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2002); Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United 
States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
187. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
188. Id. at 453–54; see also Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 489–
90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights 
Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 
892–94 (D.D.C. 1974). The Southern District of New York concluded, “[t]hird party suits to compel 
tax collection as a means to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights do not pose the threat of clogging the federal 
revenue pipeline that taxpayer-sought injunctions would present because third party suits are ‘few 
and far between.’” Regan, 544 F. Supp. at 489 (quoting Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 836 n.52 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
189. McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 453–54. 
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The court looked to the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act as a tax 
increasing measure to create this exception. 
In addition to these two exceptions, challengers have also avoided the 
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act when courts find that 
the Acts do not apply. Possibly creating a new exception, the Supreme 
Court recently circumvented the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory 
Judgment Act’s limitation on pre-enforcement litigation with an 
interesting turn of language of what constitutes a “tax.” In National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,190 the Court held the 
healthcare mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 was a tax for purposes of the Constitution but not for purposes of 
the Anti-Injunction Act.191 Two former IRS commissioners, Mortimer 
Caplin and Sheldon Cohen, filed an amici curiae brief arguing the Anti-
Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act prevented pre-
enforcement judicial review of the mandate.192 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court distinguished between a “tax” for statutory and 
constitutional bases, denying the application of the Anti-Injunction Act 
and the Declaratory Judgment Act to the penalty that is administered 
through the tax system.193 
Consistent with this reasoning, earlier the Supreme Court found the 
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act did not limit certain 
pre-enforcement challenges because the regulation did not implicate the 
statutory language of “for the purpose of” or “with respect to” the 
“assessment or collection” of a tax required by the Anti-Injunction Act 
or Declaratory Judgment Act.194 This language has been debated, and the 
results may come down to fine points of language or what the regulation 
requires. According to the Supreme Court, the regulation’s connection to 
tax collection does not have to be direct to warrant application of the 
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act.195 
                                                     
190. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
191. Id. at 546, 574; see also Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird Special” Indeed!: 
Why the Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage Provision, 
121 YALE L.J. F. 389, 397–99 (2012); Steve R. Johnson, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Individual 
Mandate, 133 TAX NOTES 1395, 1399–1400 (2011); Kevin Walsh, The Anti-Injunction Act, 
Congressional Inactivity, and Pre-Enforcement Challenges to § 5000A of the Tax Code, 46 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 823, 838–43 (2012). 
192. Johnson, supra note 191, at 1399. 
193. Nat’l Fed’n, 567 U.S. at 564–67. 
194. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012); Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. 
§ 7421 (2012). 
195. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 739–40 (1974); Alexander v. “Ams. United,” 
Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760–61 (1974). However, Congress permits this review for tax-exempt status in 
I.R.C. § 7428 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
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For example, in Bob Jones University v. Simon,196 a private university 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from an IRS plan to withdraw its 
tax-exempt status.197 The university had received a determination of its 
tax-exempt status in 1942, but in 1970 the IRS changed its position so 
that private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies 
would not be granted tax-exempt status.198 Although the university 
claimed the issue was not its tax obligation but its flow of contributions, 
the Court did not accept this because of the consequence it would have 
for the institution’s tax liability.199 That there may be non-tax-related 
motives “ignores the fact that petitioner has not shown that the Service’s 
action is without an independent basis in the requirements of the 
Code.”200 Consequently, the Court applied the Anti-Injunction Act and 
denied hearing. If there were “no access at all to judicial review . . . our 
conclusion might well be different,” but because there would be an 
opportunity to litigate when the university has taxable income or pays 
employment taxes, the litigation was delayed.201 
Similarly, in Alexander v. “Americans United,” Inc.,202 another 
nonprofit organization sought to challenge its loss of tax-exempt 
status.203 This organization, with a stated purpose to defend and 
disseminate information regarding the separation of church and state, 
received a letter ruling from the IRS in 1950 classifying it as a section 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt entity.204 When the IRS found in 1969 that a 
substantial part of the organization’s activities were lobbying for 
legislation, not permissible for a section 501(c)(3) entity, the IRS 
revoked the letter.205 The organization sought injunctive relief requiring 
its reinstatement as a tax-exempt organization. The IRS permitted it to 
be a 501(c)(4) entity, also exempt from tax, but donations would not be 
deductible by donors under section 170.206 This latter tax effect was 
sufficient to prevent pre-enforcement review, especially as the entity 
could litigate the issue in a refund of unemployment taxes. The Court 
                                                     
196. 416 U.S. 725 (1974). 
197. Id. at 734. 
198. Id. at 734–35, 739–40; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
199. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 738–39. 
200. Id. at 740. 
201. Id. at 746. 
202. 416 U.S. 752 (1974). 
203. Id. at 755–56. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
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was not swayed by the fact that the organization raised constitutional 
matters or that it was not the organization’s own taxes that were at 
issue.207 
Continuing the high hurdle for those seeking to challenge Treasury 
Department rules, in Debt Buyers’ Ass’n v. Snow,208 decided in 2006, the 
D.C. District Court disallowed pre-enforcement review of rules requiring 
the reporting of information about the purchasers of delinquent 
consumer loans.209 Although the possible tax liability was for those who 
sold the loans, it was the buyers who had to file reports of the purchases. 
The court held this reporting requirement helps the IRS determine 
whether other taxpayers pay their taxes. The issue for the court was that 
“any action that hinders the IRS in determining the accuracy of [reported 
gross] income will in fact hinder the assessment and collection of 
taxes . . . .”210 Because the purchasers could file a penalty-refund suit, 
they were not without recourse. 
For a moment, the pendulum appeared to swing back in the D.C. 
District Court in 2014 in Florida Bankers Ass’n v. Department of 
Treasury.211 The lower court held that the Anti-Injunction Act and 
Declaratory Judgment Act did not prevent a challenge to regulations 
requiring banks to report interest income earned by aliens from certain 
treaty countries.212 Although this interest is not taxable in the U.S., 
according to the Treasury Department, the information is necessary to 
comply with information-sharing agreements with other countries. The 
Bankers Association argued the Treasury Department acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously by failing to consider that some people would withdraw 
funds from U.S. banks in response to the reporting requirement.213 
The lower court permitted review of the regulations but found in 
favor of the government. The district court concluded that the 
regulations did not restrain the assessment or collection of taxes but only 
imposed a reporting requirement.214 The district court went on to hold 
that the Treasury Department did not act arbitrarily and capriciously.215 
Banks do not owe tax on the reported income even though a penalty, 
                                                     
207. Id. at 759–61. 
208. 481 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). 
209. Id. at 3. 
210. Id. at 9. 
211. 19 F. Supp. 3d. 111 (D.D.C. 2014).  
212. Id.  
213. Id. 
214. Id.  
215. Id. at 120–21. 
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defined in the Code to be a tax, attached, if a bank failed to meet its 
reporting requirements.216 Under the lower court’s reading, the Anti-
Injunction Act does not apply to reporting requirements. Although the 
court ultimately sided with the government, it lessened the government’s 
protection from pre-enforcement procedural litigation. 
However, this decision was overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals on the grounds that the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory 
Judgment Act did, in fact, bar the suit.217 The circuit court held it was 
not permissible to circumvent the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory 
Judgment Act by challenging only the regulatory aspect of a regulatory 
tax. The issue for the court was that the challenge to the regulation also 
challenged the tax for failure to comply (although termed a penalty). 
According to the circuit court, Florida Bankers Ass’n differs from the 
1987 case Foodservice and Lodging Institute, Inc. v. Regan218 because 
the penalty attached to the reporting requirement reviewed in 2014 was a 
tax under the Code.219 In Foodservice, the penalty was not itself listed in 
the provision governing taxes.220 Therefore, of four regulations 
questioned in Foodservice, the plaintiffs were allowed to challenge one 
that required restaurants to report the amount of tips collected in a given 
year because that regulation was to provide “data useful for assessing tip 
compliance,” but no tax attached for the failure to comply.221 Although 
the court in Foodservice ultimately concluded that the Treasury 
Department “considered and reasonably rejected the appellant’s 
concerns” in this fourth regulation, the critical issue was that procedural 
challenges to the reporting requirement were not off limits because of 
the Anti-Injunction Act or Declaratory Judgment Act in cases where 
penalties are not designated as taxes.222 
Belying the support courts give to the tax system in cases involving 
the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act, the government 
did not raise these challenges in Loving v. IRS,223 showing that the 
                                                     
216. I.R.C. §§ 6721, 6671 (2012). The penalty is in Chapter 68 Subchapter B per section 6721. 
Section 6671(a) defines penalties imposed by Title 26, including Chapter 68, Subchapter B, as taxes 
unless otherwise provided.  
217. Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
218. 809 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
219. Id. at 846. But see California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1981) (California’s 
reporting requirement pursuant to ERISA is subject to the Declaratory Judgment Act).  
220. Foodservice, 809 F.2d at 846. 
221. Id. The other regulations involved the assessment of tax and the employer could “refuse to 
comply, pay the statutory fine, and sue for a refund of the fine.” Id. at 843–45. 
222. Id. at 847. 
223. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’g 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that IRS 
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government recognizes there are limits to these protections. In Loving, 
decided in 2014, the taxpayer won a pre-enforcement challenge to tax 
regulations that imposed competency testing, continuing education, and 
ethics requirements on tax return preparers.224 The link to tax assessment 
and collection was too tenuous for the government to raise Anti-
Injunction Act claims. The Court held the IRS did not have statutory 
authority for the regulations and permanently enjoined them. 
There is scholarly concern over the application of these statutory 
prohibitions to pre-enforcement challenges. Early discussions of these 
statutes teased out when tax cases could be heard because, as mentioned 
above, the provisions do not prevent all pre-enforcement litigation.225 
More recently, these provisions are often recognized, and critiqued, as 
exceptional, compared to the general preference for pre-enforcement 
litigation in other areas of law.226 The focus has turned to the problems 
with delaying tax litigation over procedural and substantive matters until 
a refund claim or deficiency litigation.227 As discussed more fully in the 
next Part, concerns today generally accept that the law permits the delay 
of certain issues coming before a court but are frustrated by the results. 
C. Prudential Limitations 
In addition to statutory limits on pre-enforcement tax litigation, 
justiciability doctrines, such as standing and ripeness, complicate the 
prospects for litigation over the procedures used to create tax guidance. 
Justiciability doctrines derive from the Constitution’s cases and 
controversies requirement.228 Some of these limitations can be waived, 
but some may not. Many agencies are increasingly, and successfully, 
raising these challenges to limit judicial review of their actions.229 
Historically, justiciability was rarely raised in the tax context because 
of the existence of the statutory limitations on litigation discussed 
                                                     
failed to object in lower court to the remedies and the court found them appropriate). 
224. Id.  
225. Scholars were divided over the appropriate level of judicial review outside of the audit 
context. See Asofsky, supra note 158, at 786; James Lenoir, Congressional Control Over Suits to 
Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 177 (1961); Norton, supra 
note 169 at 622–23. 
226. See supra note 8. 
227. These limits on pre-enforcement litigation are unlikely to reduce Treasury Department pre-
promulgation work because of potential challenges in the event of enforcement activity. See 
Murphy, supra note 2, at 23. 
228. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
229. Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 957, 960. 
09 - McMahon.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:22 AM 
2017] PRE-ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION NEEDED 1353 
 
above.230 Consequently, few studies focus on justiciability and taxation 
because of the limited number of tax standing cases. Non-tax specialists 
tend to lump tax with other cases on standing, often ignoring any 
interaction with the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.231 Therefore, only in narrow circumstances is standing likely to be 
an issue in tax. These prudential concerns most often apply to third 
parties seeking judicial intervention against the IRS rather than affected 
taxpayers.232 The two aspects of justiciability likely to become issues for 
pre-enforcement tax litigation are standing and ripeness. 
First, with respect to standing, over the years the Supreme Court has 
created a framework for what is required for a case to have standing in 
the courts. Without standing, a case must be dismissed without 
consideration of the case’s merits. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,233 
the Court wrote: 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action 
of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be 
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will 
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”234 
Thus, standing requires an injury in fact, a causal connection between 
that injury and the law that is challenged, and that the court’s decision 
could redress the injury. 
In order to establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must prove the 
injury. How strictly this requirement is to be interpreted has varied over 
time.235 Injuries are often defined broadly and recognized as to 
                                                     
230. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1174–76. 
231. E.g., Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the 
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 433–34 (2009); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A 
Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 655–56 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 
615–17 (1999). 
232. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1175.  
233. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
234. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted). 
235. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); 
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“‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as well as economic 
values.”236 However, abstract and indefinite injuries are not 
constitutionally cognizable injuries, so there can be no judicial review. 
Concrete, though widely shared, injuries might pass the threshold.237 In 
2016, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,238 the Supreme Court reiterated that the 
injury must be “particularized” and concrete.239 In that case, procedural 
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act alone were insufficient to 
establish an injury in fact, despite congressional designation of an 
intangible harm.240 
An agency’s failure to follow proper procedures must fit within this 
rubric in order to be justiciable. Thus, there is a hurdle despite a Justice 
Antonin Scalia footnote that “‘procedural rights’ are special.”241 
Nevertheless, the Court would not recognize that violation of a 
congressionally-conferred right to everyone of “an abstract, self-
contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the 
procedures required by law” creates an injury in fact.242 The footnote has 
been interpreted as accepting that a “justiciable claim may be presented 
by the agency’s failure to comply with statutory mandates” in a more 
narrowly defined way.243 For example, a court found that an agency 
permitting an interested party to have ex parte communications, 
prohibited as a procedural matter in a formal proceeding, adversely 
affected “particularized interests in fair decision making” and was 
therefore be justiciable.244 
Nevertheless, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez,245 the Supreme 
Court suggested that procedural harms alone are unlikely to suffice as an 
                                                     
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 
(1990); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
236. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (citations 
omitted). 
237. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25. 
238. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
239. Id. at 1548. 
240. Id. at 1550. 
241. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (challenging regulation that 
other agencies must confer with Secretary of the Interior under the Endangered Species Act only in 
limited circumstances). 
242. Id. at 573. 
243. Cynthia R. Farina, Standing, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AGENCIES 17, 35 (John Fitzgerald Duffy & Michael E. Herz eds., 2005).  
244. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1255, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
245. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
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injury in fact unless there is proof that this harm caused an injury to 
concrete interests.246 The procedural right at issue must protect concrete 
interests to permit the person to litigate the right, and statutory grants of 
these rights only avert the need for the litigant to prove redressability 
and immediacy. In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,247 being deprived 
of the ability to comment on regulations was insufficient to show an 
injury in fact even though the procedural right was granted by 
Congress.248 
Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove a link between the procedure 
and substantive agency action.249 This is the case even if it leaves 
plaintiffs waiting for enforcement. For example, courts may require 
taxpayers to wait until after penalties are assessed before they are 
allowed to challenge the procedure regarding the rule. In Stephenson v. 
Brady,250 the plaintiff alleged, in part, that required informational returns 
referenced in the regulations were invalid because they had not gone 
through notice-and-comment.251 Despite the taxpayer having been 
threatened with penalties and prior negotiations with the IRS falling 
apart the court concluded that there was no injury until the penalty was 
assessed. 
This does not mean procedural claims are never heard. In 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,252 the Court 
permitted “standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief 
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that 
allegedly harmed the litigant.”253 In this case involving the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, the EPA’s failure to act 
gave Massachusetts standing because the EPA’s refusal presented a risk 
to the state of rising sea levels.254 Although refusals to act are given the 
                                                     
246. Id. at 764 (wife did not have protected property interest in police enforcement of restraining 
order because seeking an arrest warrant is “an entitlement to nothing but procedure”); see also Ctr. 
for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (advocacy group 
lacked standing to challenge alleged defect in rulemaking committee due to lack of particularized 
harm). 
247. 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
248. Id. at 496–97. 
249. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992); Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). 
250. No. 90-3042, 1991 WL 22835 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1991) (per curiam). 
251. Id. at *2. 
252. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
253. Id. at 518. 
254. Id.  
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utmost in deference, the Court nevertheless demanded agency action. 
Moreover, in Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v. 
Veneman,255 the D.C. Circuit also said that a person “who alleges a 
deprivation of a procedural protection to which he is entitled never has 
to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive result 
would have been altered.”256 In this case, a payment-in-kind program 
increased the supply of sugar depressing its price, but the program was 
issued without notice-and-comment. Thus, the key is to prove the failure 
of procedure affected the resulting guidance and that guidance caused an 
injury, not that the lack of procedure was harmful. 
The requirement that there be an injury in fact cannot be waived. 
These issues are jurisdictional.257 Therefore, even if they want to, the 
petitioner and government cannot simply assume an injury or that 
standing is self-evident. Courts are to raise the issue sua sponte.258 When 
confronted with the issue, the Court held that “the requirement of injury 
in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed 
by statute.”259 This may mean that the parties invited to comment on 
guidance and otherwise influence policy choices are prevented from 
receiving judicial review of the agency’s procedures.260 
Thus, courts have not allowed Congress to circumvent the required 
injury in fact, a prerequisite of standing, even though the doctrine is 
muddled.261 How it will apply in the tax context is unknown. The 
general position was established in 1923 when the Supreme Court 
denied a taxpayer suit regarding government expenditures on the 
grounds that the taxpayer’s interest in government revenue, as one of 
millions of taxpayers, was too small.262 According to the Court: 
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then 
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the 
statute here under review, but also in respect of every other 
appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the 
                                                     
255. 289 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
256. Id. at 94–95. 
257. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 229, at 963. 
258. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
259. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
260. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 229, at 960. 
261. Coplan, supra note 231; Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131 
(2009). 
262. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (litigating the Maternity Act of 1921, 
conditioning federal aid to states on programs to protect maternal health). 
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outlay of public money, and whose validity may be 
questioned.263 
The Court worried that judicial review “would operate to disturb the 
whole revenue system of the government.”264 The IRS’s regulatory 
behavior may be subject to evaluation and contest but not by an 
unlimited number of parties. 
In addition to proving an injury in fact, those who question the 
Treasury Department’s procedures may struggle to satisfy the causation 
prong of the standing test. In general, regulated parties, in the tax context 
those who owe tax, can more easily demonstrate that the law caused 
injury than can the beneficiaries of regulation, in the tax context those 
who receive benefits from federal funding. Also, in the tax context, 
causation is difficult for taxpayers who are relatively disadvantaged by 
not receiving a particular tax preference. The Supreme Court accepts the 
difficulty this creates for some plaintiffs, noting the injury is often less 
direct but “hinge[s] on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third 
party to the government action or inaction.”265 Although standing is not 
precluded in these cases, “it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to 
establish.”266 
Through the application of the standing doctrine, courts may deny 
third-party standing in tax matters.267 In a two-sentence 1976 
concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart wrote, “I cannot now imagine a 
case . . . where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever 
could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone 
else.”268 The D.C. Circuit goes so far to state, “[i]t is well-recognized 
that the standing inquiry in tax cases is more restrictive than in other 
cases.”269 
These limitations mean that direct beneficiaries of programs may not 
be able to litigate changes in IRS policy. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization,270 indigent rights organizations sought to 
                                                     
263. Id. 
264. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914); see also Richard B. Stewart, Standing for 
Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1568 (1979). 
265. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
266. Id. 
267. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systemic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing 
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 774 (2003). 
268. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(excepting the First Amendment).  
269. Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2006). 
270. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
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challenge a revenue ruling, a form of IRS guidance that does not 
complete notice-and-comment, that reduced the requirement for tax-
exempt hospitals to offer emergency care to those unable to pay.271 The 
plaintiffs challenged both the substance of the ruling and the lack of 
procedure in its creation.272 Instead of relying on the Anti-Injunction Act 
and Declaratory Judgment Act, the Supreme Court dismissed the case 
for lack of standing.273 The Court concluded that the connection between 
the ruling and the denial of medical services was too speculative; even if 
the rule were changed, there is no reason to know that the plaintiff would 
get medical care or even that the hospital would pursue tax-exempt 
status.274 In Fulani v. Brady,275 when a presidential candidate sought to 
invalidate the tax-exempt status of a presidential debate sponsor, the 
D.C. Circuit Court took issue with the plaintiff seeking to change the 
agency’s rule “only as a means to alter the conduct of a third party.”276 
The combination of standing and the statutory prohibitions often 
reduce judicial review through a two-step sieve. If litigation is not 
stopped by one, it is stopped by the other. For example, in National 
Taxpayers Union v. United States,277 the D.C. Circuit accepted that a 
taxpayer organization established standing on behalf of the group’s 
members to raise an early constitutional challenge against a retroactive 
tax rate increase.278 Nevertheless, the court then blocked the litigation 
with the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Examining the standing rules as they apply to the review of tax-
exempt charities’ qualifications, Lynn Lu has criticized the inability of 
those with interests in tax regulations, but who are not the direct object 
of the regulation, to contest them in court.279 Lu provides two examples 
of failed challenges on standing grounds: people unable to pay for 
medical care challenging the IRS change of requirements for tax-exempt 
hospitals and African-American families challenging the tax-exempt 
status of de facto segregated private schools.280 The goal, at least for Lu, 
                                                     
271. Id. at 33. 
272. Id.  
273. Id. at 46. 
274. Id. at 45–46. 
275. 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
276. Id. at 1330 (emphasis in original). 
277. 68 F.3d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
278. Id. at 1435. 
279. Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism: Expanding Access to Judicial 
Review of Federal Agency Rules, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 73 (2014). 
280. Id. at 89; E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973), rev’d sub 
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is to use the judicial process to circumvent the agency and Congress; to 
accomplish what they would not do. 
Some cases in which judicial review was denied were politically 
sensitive and unlikely to elicit a favorable legislative response when the 
courts refused to act. For example, in Allen v. Wright,281 the Court 
denied standing to challenge income tax exemptions for racially 
segregated schools.282 Although the injury in fact in Allen was the same 
as that in Bob Jones and “one of the most serious injuries recognized in 
our legal system,” the “links in the chain of causation between the 
challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too 
weak.”283 The Court would not go so far as to permit litigation to force 
the IRS to do what it had voluntarily done in Bob Jones. 
Because standing is a constitutional jurisdictional requirement, 
exceptions to the standing requirement are narrowly drawn. In Flast v. 
Cohen,284 the Supreme Court recognized such an exception when it 
granted standing to taxpayers who sought to enjoin the use of federal 
funds to buy textbooks for parochial schools.285 However, Flast was 
more of a First Amendment case than a tax case because of its focus on 
the separation of church and state. Although Flast indicated that Article 
III does not prohibit taxpayer suits, its holding is generally limited to its 
facts and may not extend to administrative actions. For example, in Hein 
v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,286 the Court declined to grant 
standing to challenge the White House’s use of federal money to fund 
conferences to promote “faith-based initiatives.”287 That it was executive 
                                                     
nom. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vac’d, Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev’d 
sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. 
737 (1984). Ignoring that potential claimants to pre-enforcement litigation could be limitless, Lu’s 
proposal would pressure the definition of particularized, concrete injuries. Nichol, supra note 231, 
at 655–56; Sunstein, supra note 231, at 615–17. 
281. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 756, 759; Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). 
284. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
285. Id. Flast held that the Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) limit on taxpayer 
standing was only prudential in nature, thus suggesting that there might be standing if authorized by 
Congress. See also Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1042–43 (2009). 
286. 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
287. Id. at 602–03 (drawing a distinction between congressional action and executive 
discretion); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618–20 (1988); Valley Forge Christian Coll. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982); United States. v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974). In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 
563 U.S. 125, 141–43 (2011), the Court held that Arizona state tax credits did not count as 
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action made it beyond the reach of Flast standing. Flast has been the 
only Supreme Court case allowing a taxpayer to challenge spending as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Thus, standing for the public in tax matters is limited so that in most 
cases pre-enforcement litigation is not permitted.288 Similar to the Anti-
Injunction Act, the “inconvenience and relatively minor expense” of 
complying with regulations before filing suit in response to a tax audit is 
insufficient to justify earlier judicial review.289 The tools that the 
Treasury Department or IRS use to prevent pre-enforcement litigation in 
a particular case, whether statute or common law, may differ, but the 
result is often the same. 
Additional prudential principles of standing may be waived by 
Congress but to date are rarely waived in the tax context.290 Waivable 
prudential principles include the prohibition on a litigant raising another 
person’s legal rights and the rule barring adjudication of generalized 
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches. 
The latter arises frequently in the tax context but is infrequently waived. 
Without congressional waiver, courts may refrain from deciding 
“abstract questions of wide public significance,” which amount to 
“generalized grievances” that would be better addressed by Congress.291 
When the public as a group shares concerns about unfair administration, 
courts routinely dismiss the generalized grievance to prevent overuse of 
the court system.292 The issue is more properly congressional than 
judicial. 
                                                     
government spending and so could not be challenged under Flast. This argument contravenes most 
academic interpretation that urges tax expenditures be equated with direct spending because they 
both cost government revenue and accomplish the same objectives, despite the court’s claim this is 
the spending of the taxpayers’ money and not the states’. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a 
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending—Does It Make a Difference?, 53 
NAT’L TAX J. 361 (2000); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and 
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004). But see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, 
Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative Base?: A Critique of the “New 
Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135, 142 (2010). 
288. Magill, supra note 261. 
289. Stephenson v. Brady, No. 90-3042, 1991 WL 22835, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1991) (per 
curiam). 
290. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
291. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975); see also United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973). 
292. See id. 
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A final justiciability consideration is the ripeness of the issue. The 
issue of ripeness is not whether jurisdiction exists but whether the case is 
currently ready for adjudication. Ripeness requires the issue be fit for 
judicial decision and the parties must experience hardship, namely a 
legal wrong, without judicial consideration of the case. Ripeness issues 
frequently arise when plaintiffs seek anticipatory relief. In Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner,293 the Supreme Court held that ripeness’s 
“basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
administrative policies, and also to protect agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its 
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.”294 Despite the 
rhetoric, Abbott Laboratories upheld pre-enforcement review of an 
administrative regulation. 
Abbott Laboratories established an expansive presumption in favor of 
early judicial review of agency action that has since been narrowed.295 
Nevertheless, ripeness is rarely a high hurdle for procedural challenges 
to agency rules unless the court determines that the practical application 
of the rule would assist in the judicial evaluation.296 The issue is likely to 
turn on whether the challenge is to the rule on its face or whether the 
challenge “depends as well on the way in which the [rule] will be 
applied.”297 This may be a higher standard if the rule confers a benefit 
than if the rule imposes a burden.298 
Much of the difficulty created by the standing and ripeness doctrines 
to the ability to make procedural claims against tax guidance would 
occur whether or not the claim is raised before or after enforcement. It is 
difficult for third parties to prove the required injury occurred. Pre-
enforcement litigation of tax guidance has the additional difficulty of 
proving the issue is ripe because it is unknown whether the rule will be 
enforced at all. Ripeness will be a particular concern for forms of tax 
guidance that are not generally applicable or that purport to forecast 
future regulations. 
                                                     
293. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
294. Id. at 148–49. 
295. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1180. 
296. Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But see Nat’l 
Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810–11 (2003); Reno v. Catholic Soc. 
Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57–59 (1993). 
297. Cement Kiln, 493 F.3d at 216. 
298. Reno, 509 U.S. at 58–59. 
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Consequently, despite the APA’s preference for pre-enforcement, it is 
surprising that any litigation over the procedures used to promulgate tax 
guidance is successfully litigated before enforcement. Part of the 
difficulty is the complexity of the issues even when divorced from 
taxation. Hickman summarizes these doctrinal issues succinctly: “the 
law in this area is a mess.”299 These messy prudential requirements 
would not be eliminated even if statutory limits were repealed. 
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION 
Although the creation of tax guidance must comply with the APA, 
interested parties often find it difficult to challenge the Treasury 
Department’s compliance in courts.300 When they can undertake such a 
challenge, the challenge is often after the law has been applied to them 
so that they are challenging operative guidance. Under this system, some 
types of procedural claims can never be made, and people not directly 
impacted by tax guidance cannot challenge it, either substantively or 
procedurally. There is a cost of these timing and scope limitations. When 
courts hear the challenge after the guidance has affected many taxpayers, 
there are costs to taxpayers and the tax system. Taxpayer rights and the 
consistency of the tax law are jeopardized through the delayed or limited 
litigation of procedural complaints. 
A. Courts Belatedly Confront Procedural Claims 
Taxpayers are increasingly bringing cases asking courts to invalidate 
regulations and other forms of tax guidance because of the Treasury 
Department’s or IRS’s lack of appropriate procedure, but these cases are 
generally heard only late in the life of the guidance.301 These late 
challenges appear from blog reports and academic articles to be 
increasing in frequency but rarely earlier in their timing.302 Courts 
generally hear these cases only late in the process of a taxpayer 
                                                     
299. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1200. 
300. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Comm’r, 348 F.3d 136, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (the Sixth Circuit 
pointed out the failure to make procedural claims). 
301. The Court has not always focused on procedural issues. For example, in 2003, ignoring the 
issue of the APA, in Boeing Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted that even if the 
regulations governing cost allocations were interpretive, they would be entitled to deference and, 
moreover, they were not arbitrary. 537 U.S. 437 (2003). The Court, instead, jumped into the 
substance of the regulation and whether it conformed to the statute. 
302. Hickman concluded in 2008, “taxpayers rarely contest Treasury regulations on procedural 
grounds.” A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1154.  
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challenging that taxpayer’s personal tax liability. Thus, the guidance is 
challenged in response to a taxpayer’s audit and failed negotiation with 
the agency and long after the guidance has operated on taxpayers. A few 
cases have successfully made it before courts earlier in the process, but 
early litigation is hard to secure under current law and heavily depends 
on the facts of the case to show the tax itself is not being challenged.303 
For example, regulations imposing information reporting obligations are 
susceptible to procedural challenge whereas a deduction or loss thereof 
would not be. This distinction puts pressure on courts that may seek to 
grant procedural review but generally can only do so belatedly. 
In 2015, the D.C. Circuit summarized the imperfect mesh of case law, 
holding that the Anti-Injunction Act: (1) prevents litigation over an 
organization’s tax status (Bob Jones and “Americans United”), except 
for statutorily authorized actions; (2) permits litigation when the plaintiff 
has no other means to challenge the result (South Carolina) or the 
challenge does not affect tax assessment and collection (Cohen); and (3) 
permits litigation if the IRS engages in viewpoint discrimination 
(Regan).304 Through this relative maze of law, taxpayers seek to overturn 
unfavorable regulations before they apply to prevent potential penalties 
or the cost of compliance. 
Temporary regulations issued by the Treasury Department regarding 
inversions illustrate the complexity of the case law challengers face 
when bringing early procedural claims. For example, the Chamber of 
Commerce filed a lawsuit in Texas seeking to block the temporary 
inversion regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department in April 
2016.305 Inversions are when a U.S. corporation relocates its legal 
domicile outside the U.S. to avoid U.S. taxation on its worldwide 
income. Section 7874, the statutory basis of the regulations, disqualifies 
inversions for U.S. tax purposes in certain limited circumstances to force 
the parent corporation to remain subject to U.S. taxation.306 Congress 
enacted the statute in 2004 to target inversions using a merger of a U.S. 
                                                     
303. The issue of the procedure used for the promulgation of tax guidance is often wrapped up in 
issues of the proper amount of deference that courts should give to that guidance. The Supreme 
Court unanimously extended Chevron deference to tax regulations in 2011 in Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education & Research v. United States. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). Although claiming a changed 
regulatory interpretation originated in the Department’s general authority to issue needful rules and 
regulations, the Department used notice and comment procedures to do so, a fact noted by the 
Court. Thereafter, the Court ruled that the Treasury Department “certainly did not act irrationally” 
in its regulations as it upheld their application. Id. at 60.  
304. Z Street v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
305. Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-cv-944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016). 
306. I.R.C. § 7874 (2012). 
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corporation into a foreign corporation if the foreign acquirer’s 
shareholders do not retain a meaningful stake in the new foreign parent 
corporation.307 In other words, the U.S. government ignores the 
inversion if U.S. shareholders retain a sufficiently large stake in the new 
foreign parent corporation. 
The regulations extend the definition of disqualified mergers to deny 
a tax effect if a U.S. corporation merges into a foreign corporation, but 
U.S. shareholders retain a smaller stake in the corporation than defined 
in the statute if other facts that make the inversion appear abusive.308 
This agency action is not surprising given the political reaction to 
American corporations moving offshore; the issue is the means by which 
the IRS tries to deter the activity. In the face of congressional opposition 
to former President Barack Obama’s desire to thwart these inversions, 
the regulations create a three-year lookback rule to ensure the foreign 
company did not increase in its size to avoid the prior inversion 
threshold.309 
It is commonly accepted that these new regulations were issued on 
April 5, 2016 to block the $152 billion merger of Ireland-based 
Allergan, Plc and New York-based Pfizer, Inc. and to dissuade other 
companies from attempting similar inversions.310 In the short-term the 
strategy was successful. The Pfizer deal was called off, stating that the 
decision “was driven by the actions announced by the U.S. Department 
of Treasury . . .”311 
As part of its litigation strategy, the Chamber of Commerce argued 
that the temporary regulations, issued in conjunction with proposed 
regulations, exceed the Treasury Department’s statutory authority, are 
arbitrary and capricious, and failed to follow notice-and-comment 
procedures. In particular, the Chamber complained that the temporary 
regulation was issued without prior notice-and-comment and without 
                                                     
307. The statute defines a meaningful stake as sixty percent of the voting and eighty percent of 
the value of the new corporation. Id. 
308. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7874-8T(g)(6) (2016).  
309. Id. 
310. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, IRS Tax Inversion Rule Change Draws Chamber of Commerce 
Suit, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-04/irs-tax-
inve [https://perma.cc/J39K-XCXM]; Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan 
Are Said to End Merger as Tax Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/tax-inver?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/H9GC-
LC26].  
311. Pfizer Announces Termination of Proposed Combination with Allergan (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer_announces_termination_of_ 
proposed_combination_with_allergan [https://perma.cc/V9HG-KDJ5].  
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sufficient explanation for doing so; the Treasury Department’s statement 
claimed that it had “determined that sections 553(b) and (d) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act” did not apply.312 
A difficulty for the Chamber to achieve early review, however, is 
proving standing. In particular, as required by Lujan, the Chamber must 
prove someone was injured by the regulations. If Pfizer had 
consummated its transaction and then been subject to tax, it would have 
had the requisite injury in fact.313 But the regulations operate in practice 
to prevent challenges by dissuading the activity because the potential 
cost is too high. This standing issue increases the difficulty of the case 
and is, perhaps, one reason the case was initiated in Texas, a more 
taxpayer-friendly jurisdiction than Pfizer’s home state of New York. 
Moreover, even if standing is satisfied, Daniel Hemel notes this case 
is likely to be dismissed because of the Anti-Injunction Act; the parties 
must wait until after it has been applied to taxpayers.314 The Chamber 
seeks the court to set aside a rule that it does not like because the rule 
makes it harder for corporations to avoid the inversion limits. The effect 
of overturning the rule would be to restrain the IRS from assessing and 
collecting tax because more inversions could occur, placing more 
revenue outside the reach of the IRS. The purpose of the Anti-Injunction 
Act is to prevent litigation such as this that would frustrate the collection 
of revenue.315 However, the likely result is that even if the regulation is 
ultimately declared invalid, no one will risk the penalties from 
undertaking a big stakes transaction so the regulation accomplishes its 
objective. 
Additionally, the proposed regulations attempt to limit earnings 
stripping by which American subsidiaries borrow from foreign parent or 
affiliated corporations. Challengers to this part of the regulations face 
similar difficulties as do those opposing the inversion rules, although it 
is more likely businesses will risk penalties to challenge the earnings 
stripping rule after their application because the stakes are not as high. 
                                                     
312. T.D. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 68, 20882 (Apr. 8, 2016); Fed. Reg. 135734-14 (May 2, 2016). 
313. Despite Pfizer’s claim, it is unlikely the transaction was sufficiently developed to permit a 
claim that Pfizer had an imminent business transaction that fell through as a direct result of the new 
tax regulation, which would be a difficult claim with the best facts. 
314. Daniel Hemel, The Chamber of Commerce Has an Anti-Injunction Act Problem, MEDIUM 
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-chamber-of-commerce-has-an-
anti-injunction-act-problem-9cc28f6947c#.ch14uwtxe [https://perma.cc/67XR-V6UU]; see also 
Challenging the IRS Anti-Inversion Notice: A Hollow Threat, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & 
FLOM LLP (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/challenging-irs-anti-inversion-notice-
hollow-threat [https://perma.cc/7REJ-LP5H].  
315. See supra note 156.  
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The issue is that on the payment of interest, an American corporation 
may claim a tax deduction, reducing its income in the U.S. even as it 
increases income reportable in another country. Traditionally these types 
of loans have received favorable U.S. tax treatment but are not reported 
on financial statements because they occur within one larger 
conglomerate. The regulations seek to target this earnings stripping by 
treating related-party debt as stock. The payment of dividends, unlike 
interest, is not tax deductible, thereby eliminating the current tax benefit 
enjoyed by these loans.316 
These proposed regulations on earnings stripping have since been 
finalized after a significant number of comments were received, and it 
remains to be seen if they will be challenged.317 The final regulations 
contain a number of changes in response to “detailed and thoughtful 
comments.”318 For example, exceptions were added for several ordinary 
business transactions. Additionally, the effective date for a 
documentation requirement for interests to be treated as indebtedness 
was only for debt instruments issued on or after January 1, 2018, 
whereas the other rules are generally effective on or after January 19, 
2017. Showing its response to potential procedural litigation, the 
Department issued a 380-page preamble to its final regulations to prove 
its response to the public’s comments. 
The earnings stripping issue is controversial and likely to face its own 
litigation, in part based on procedure. Although taxpayers may seek pre-
enforcement review, they are unlikely to receive it. For example, the 
Business Round Table complained that, when proposed, the regulations 
did not comply with the APA’s effective date and had an “insufficient 
[comment period] given the complexity of the regulations.”319 The Daily 
Tax Report noted that “[r]eams of paper filled with detailed technical 
responses to comments won’t stop court challenges” to the new rules.320 
However, problems with the Anti-Injunction Act remain, and the result 
is likely to be delayed litigation, less on the procedure than on the 
                                                     
316. I.R.C. § 163 (2012). 
317. T.D. 9790, 81 Fed. Reg. 204. 
318. Id. at 72859.  
319. Doug Oberhelman et al., Letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary, BUS. ROUND TABLE (July 7, 
2016), http://businessroundtable.org/ resources/brt-comment-letter-treasury-department-proposed-
385-regulations [https://perma.cc/T7R6-L6JE].  
320. Erin McManus, Voluminous Preamble Won’t Stop Court Challenge to Debt Rules, 
BLOOMBERG BNA, DAILY TAX REPORT (Oct. 17, 2016), http://news.bna.com/dtln/display/ 
batch_print_display.adp?searchid=28625713 [https://perma.cc/C9EF-DL3J].  
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substance of the regulations.321 Not mentioning timing, the IRS’s 
associate chief counsel expects the rules to withstand legal challenge.322 
These potential cases are procedurally harder to hear early than other 
recent tax challenges, which have drawn lines around activities for the 
“assessment and collection of tax,” and therefore sought to evade the 
limitations of the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act on 
pre-enforcement litigation.323 Particularly with the expansion of 
reporting obligations, the litigating public seeks a narrow reading of this 
clause in the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act to 
permit early challenges to reporting regulations. For example, in 2015, 
in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl,324 the Supreme Court narrowly read 
the Tax Injunction Act, a law similar to the Anti-Injunction Act, but one 
that prohibits federal district courts from hearing challenges to state 
taxes in order to permit challenges to reporting requirements.325 In that 
case, Colorado law required retailers to notify Colorado customers of 
potential use tax liability and required retailers to report tax-related 
information to state tax authorities. Thus, the law imposed notice and 
reporting obligations but no additional tax. 
The Tax Injunction Act is not exactly like the Anti-Injunction Act, 
with the Tax Injunction Act adding “restrain” with “enjoin, [and] 
suspend,” but the Court “assume[d] that words used in both Acts are 
generally used in the same way . . .”326 The “assessment, levy, or 
collection” processes referred to in the statute were, according to the 
Court, discrete phases of the taxation process that “do not include 
informational notices or private reports of information relevant to tax 
liability.”327 The Court read “restrain” as having a “narrow[] 
meaning . . . captur[ing] only those orders that stop . . . ’assessment, levy 
and collection’” rather than “merely inhibit[] those activities.328 
Direct Marketing, if applied to the Anti-Injunction Act, would greatly 
expand the number of cases that could be heard pre-enforcement because 
                                                     
321. Hickman suggests the use of temporary regulations coinciding with the proposed 
regulations might be a means of challenging the final rules. Id. 
322. Kat Lucero, IRS Official: Controversial Treasury Rules Should Survive Legal Challenge, 
HILL (Oct. 28, 2016), http://origin-nyi.thehill.com/policy/finance/303325-irs-official-controversial-
treasury-rules-should-survive-legal-challenge?amp [https://perma.cc/CBV8-YY2K]. 
323. See supra notes 151–52.  
324. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). 
325. Id. at 1132.  
326. Id. at 1129. 
327. Id. at 1126. 
328. Id. at 1132–33. 
09 - McMahon.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:22 AM 
1368 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1317 
 
information gathering, “includ[ing] private reporting of information used 
to determine tax liability,” was excluded from the Tax Injunction Act.329 
Although assessment “might also be understood more broadly to 
encompass the process by which [the] amount [of tax liability] is 
calculated,” the Court chose to interpret it as the official action taken 
based on information already reported.330 In the Court’s reading in 
Direct Marketing, collection occurs only “after a formal assessment” and 
is part of the enforcement process. In this reading, guidance regarding 
anything that occurs prior to a tax return being filed is open to pre-
enforcement litigation. 
Direct Marketing is seemingly at odds with another case, discussed in 
the prior Part, Florida Bankers Ass’n v. Department of Treasury.331 
Florida Bankers is a lower court decision, but it was squarely on the 
Anti-Injunction Act. The D.C. Circuit Court held, also in 2015, that a 
pre-enforcement suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act despite its 
involving banks’ reporting obligations of the interest earned by non-
resident aliens. In Florida Bankers, the penalty imposed for failing to 
comply with the reporting requirements, although not yet imposed, was 
sufficient to trigger the statutory bar.332 Some scholars take exception to 
this as inconsistent with the new, narrower reading of these statutes.333 
Only four years before in Cohen v. United States,334 the D.C. Circuit 
had appeared to embrace a more narrow reading of the Anti-Injunction 
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act that would permit courts to hear 
cases earlier.335 In Cohen, the taxpayers did not request a refund but 
challenged the Notice announcing refund procedures on the basis the 
Notice violated the APA.336 The court denied tax an exception from 
procedural APA challenges in refund procedures laid out in Notice 
2006-50,337 and, on remand, the district court determined the notice was 
binding and therefore invalid because it had not been submitted for 
                                                     
329. Id. at 1129. 
330. Id. at 1130.  
331. 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
332. Id. at 1081. 
333. Patrick J. Smith, D.C. Circuit Majority Opinion in Florida Bankers Not Consistent with 
Supreme Court’s Direct Marketing Decisions, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/d-c-circuit-majority-opinion-in-florida-bankers-not-consistent-with-
supreme-courts-direct-marketing-decision-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/QY3E-J6MQ].  
334. 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015). 
335. Id. at 728. 
336. Id.  
337. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141. 
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notice-and-comment.338 Arguing for administrative law uniformity, the 
D.C. Circuit’s majority concluded “[t]he IRS is not special in this 
regard; no exception exists shielding it—unlike the rest of the Federal 
Government—from suit under the APA.”339 
While Cohen opens up the door to pre-enforcement litigation in the 
D.C. Circuit, Florida Bankers seems to close it unless the D.C. Circuit is 
deterred by the Direct Market decision. But Cohen had limiting facts 
because the court highlighted that its early litigation involved the refund 
of taxes already collected as opposed to the assessment and collection of 
taxes. Thus, Cohen may signal a tightening of the court’s interpretation 
of what constitutes tax collection and assessment in the Anti-Injunction 
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act. The vacatur was prospective because 
more than 100 million taxpayers had obtained refunds.340 The IRS 
continued to entertain claims filed under the contested procedures until 
2012, and the D.C. Circuit held that the IRS did not need to replace the 
procedure but that taxpayers should use general refund procedures.341 
Artful description of the assessment and collection of taxes have also 
served organizations that previously lacked standing or were unable to 
sue on issues not yet ripe, although not yet with respect to the issuance 
of tax guidance. In a 2015 case, Z Street v. Koskinen,342 a non-profit 
organization dedicated to Israeli issues sued the IRS on the grounds that 
the IRS undertook more rigorous review of its internal policies than 
other non-profits as a result of then President Barack Obama’s Middle 
East policies.343 The District Court concluded this litigation was not to 
restrain “the ‘assessment or collection’ of a tax, but rather to prevent the 
IRS from delaying consideration of its application [for tax-exempt 
status].”344 The D.C. Circuit Court agreed that Z Street had no other 
remedy, consistent with the South Carolina v. Regan exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act.345 Although Z Street could wait and pursue 
administrative remedies, those remedies only apply to the organization’s 
qualification for tax-exempt status. Here the issue was the timing of 
                                                     
338. Cohen, 650 F.3d at 721.  
339. Id. at 723. 
340. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Lit., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 144–45 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
341. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Lit., 751 F.3d 629, 634 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); Announcement 2012-16, 2012-18 I.R.B. 876. 
342. Z Street v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 26.  
345. Id. at 31.  
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consideration, not the result, because of the organization’s views on 
Israel. 
Regardless of the timing of litigation, this newer, narrower approach 
to the assessment and collection of taxes language risks opening up 
guidance to wide-ranging attacks of courts that strictly impose the APA 
on guidance not previously held to this standard. In 2012 in Dominion 
Resources Inc. v. United States,346 a taxpayer filed suit seeking a refund 
of its corporate income taxes.347 At issue was a long-standing regulation. 
A notice of upcoming regulations was published in 1988, a notice of 
proposed rulemaking was issued in 1991, and the final regulations were 
published in 1994.348 Ignoring the length of time the regulations were 
effective, the Federal Circuit invalidated the final regulation, which 
governed the capitalization of interest (as opposed to its current 
deductibility) on the grounds that the regulation was not a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.349 Applying hard look review, the court 
concluded that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious because its 
promulgation did not have a judicially mandated reasoned explanation of 
the Treasury Department’s decision-making.350 
The lower court in Dominion Resources351 had noted the procedural 
need for a reasoned explanation but dismissed the concern. The Court of 
Federal Claims had found that, while “it is a stretch to conclude” that the 
Treasury Department cogently explained its processes, the “‘path’ that 
Treasury was taking in the rulemaking proceedings could be ‘discerned,’ 
albeit somewhat murkily.”352 Examining the evolution of the regulations, 
the lower court had concluded that the public had been made aware of 
the issue and the Treasury Department had addressed commentators’ 
suggestions. Therefore, the lower court, until overturned, accepted the 
“lack of exactitude and the ensuing confusion” did not “signify that 
                                                     
346. 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
347. Id.; see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax 
Reforms, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 917, 923 (2012). 
348. Notice 88-99, 1988-2 C.B. 422; Capitalization of Interest, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,815-01 
(proposed Aug. 16, 1991); Capitalization of Interest, 59 Fed. Reg. 67,187 (Dec. 29, 1994).  
349. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B) (1995). 
350. Dominion Resources, 681 F.3d at 1319. From the tone of the opinion, it is unlikely any 
explanation would have satisfied the majority who disliked a legal fiction on which the regulations 
were based, even though the concurrence pointed out some fiction was likely inevitable. Similar 
problems existed before, but not often. See Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 267 
(Ct. Cl. 1979). 
351. 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011). 
352. Id. at 239, 259. 
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Treasury acted to establish the final rule in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.”353 
The Court of Claims in Balestra v. United States354 may have signaled 
it has backtracked from hard look review, although the case did not 
focus on the procedure used to promulgate a regulation.355 In Balestra, a 
husband and a wife who filed a joint tax return brought a refund suit for 
Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) contributions on deferred 
retirement compensation that the husband would never receive because 
his employer went bankrupt.356 The taxpayers argued that the regulation 
defining the “present value” of an “amount deferred” should have 
considered the employer’s financial condition.357 The court refused to 
substitute its own construction of the statute for what it deemed a 
reasonable interpretation by the agency.358 Although purporting to apply 
State Farm review, the court cursorily repeated the notice of proposed 
and final rulemaking. In doing so, the court found the Treasury 
Department did not act “arbitrarily or capriciously,” but that, instead, it 
sought “workable, simple, and flexible” rules.359 The “path” used to 
create the regulations was “reasonably discernable.”360 
These issues of the application of review and the timing of when the 
review is to occur will be particularly important in the Tax Court, which 
hears ninety percent of tax cases but traditionally did not focus as much 
on administrative law matters as other federal courts.361 The Tax Court 
has recently gone directly to the heart of APA procedure and its 
application to tax regulations. The Tax Court has set aside regulations 
that had undergone notice-and-comment but did not have an adequate 
statement responding to comments after their application to a particular 
taxpayer.362 In Altera Corp. v. Commissioner,363 decided in 2015, a 
                                                     
353. Id. at 259. 
354. 803 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
355. Id.  
356. Id. at 1367–68. 
357. Id. at 1369. 
358. Id. at 1374. 
359. Id. at 1363, 1371. 
360. Id. at 1374. 
361. I.R.S., DATA BOOK 63 tbl.27 (2015). For an example of the Tax Court’s traditional 
response to notice and comment, see Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail LLC v. Comm’r, 174 T.C. 
211, 245–46 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Judges Halpern and 
Holmes of the Tax Court rejected the traditional interpretation. Id. (Halpern and Holmes, J.J., 
concurring). 
362. See, e.g., Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 3 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 23, 2016).  
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unanimous Tax Court invalidated certain transfer pricing regulations 
issued in 2003.364 Multi-national corporations use transfer pricing to 
allocate expenses among their subsidiaries in different countries. In 
Altera, the regulations involved the use of stock-based compensation in 
cost-sharing arrangements.365 The affiliated group of corporations sought 
a redetermination of the deficiencies of the taxes they were found to 
owe.366 The court ruled on the grounds that the Treasury Department 
failed to comply with the APA and granted the taxpayer a partial 
summary judgment.367 
The taxpayer contested the rule of stock-based compensation in cost-
sharing arrangements, a well-known and hotly debated issue long before 
the Altera case. The issue was raised in prior litigation and also in the 
notice of proposed rulemaking and public hearings.368 There were 
thirteen submitted comments and four participants in the hearings, but 
these regulations could only be litigated after application.369 
Nevertheless, at the time the final rule was issued, the Treasury 
Department’s files did not contain expert opinions, empirical data, or 
papers that supported its position, which was opposed by the 
comments.370 The Treasury Department attempted to address comments 
by stating they “do not agree” with them despite acknowledging contrary 
“data may not be available.”371 The Department asserted that the 
evidence provided by the commentators “do[es] not share enough 
characteristics” with the issues raised by the regulations to be 
conclusive.372 The court found these were mere assertions by the 
agency.373 
Applying hard look review, the court found that the Treasury 
Department failed to undertake a necessary fact-finding in order to 
support its position.374 Moreover, the regulation’s preamble, while 
                                                     
363. 145 T.C. 3 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016). 
364. Id. at 133. 
365. Id. at 93. 
366. Id. at 91. 
367. Id. at 134. 
368. Xilinix Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37 (2005); Compensatory Stock Options Under Section 
482, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29, 2002). 
369. Altera, 145 T.C. at 104. 
370. Id. at 107. 
371. Id. at 108. 
372. T.D. 9088, 2003-2 C.B. at 842–43. 
373. Altera, 145 T.C. at 130. 
374. Id. at 122–23. 
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responding to some comments, was held not to justify the final rule.375 
The court appeared frustrated that the Treasury Department did not 
consider sufficient variables, and while “improving administrability can 
be a reasonable basis for agency action,” the Treasury Department did 
not make this claim in its preamble (although even if it did, it does not 
appear the court would accept this claim without more significant fact-
finding).376 Invalidating the regulations, the Tax Court disagreed with 
the Treasury Department that the APA did not apply and found the 
Treasury Department failed to engage in reasoned decision-making by 
not producing this evidence and not responding to several comments. As 
a result, the Treasury Department was found to have engaged in arbitrary 
and capricious decision-making.377 
This is a change in tenor but not in timing from earlier Tax Court 
decisions. For example, in 1998, in Schwalbach v. Commissioner,378 
when challenging taxes determined to be owed, the taxpayer argued that 
the passive activity loss regulations did not comply with the APA and so 
the amount of taxes the IRS claimed were owed should be reduced, and 
the Tax Court held the regulations did.379 In its discussion, the court 
focused on the interaction between the agency and the public in two 
rounds of comments rather than evaluating the wording of notices and 
comments.380 In Schwalbach, the proposed regulations had not reached 
shareholders of C corporations, but this relationship was governed by the 
final regulations.381 The court concluded that, even though this provision 
was not in the proposed regulation, the absence did not invalidate the 
notice-and-comment process, a position inconsistent with modern hard 
look review.382 
With the evolution to greater receptiveness to APA procedural 
challenges, taxpayers recognize this change as a means of changing tax 
outcomes once they have been subject to audit. In other words, savvy 
taxpayers understand that challenging procedures is now a tool when a 
taxpayer is confronted with an audit and tax deficiency. To this end, a 
                                                     
375. Id. at 118. 
376. Id. at 126. 
377. Id. at 134. 
378. 111 T.C. 215 (1998). 
379. Id.; see also Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989); Griffin Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 183 (1992); Dow Corning Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 184 
(1990); Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17 (1983). 
380. Schwalbach, 111 T.C. at 230. 
381. Id. at 220. 
382. Id. at 216. 
09 - McMahon.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:22 AM 
1374 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1317 
 
partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP wrote that “the impact of 
[Altera] and its limits on the IRS’s rulemaking authority could also be 
felt more broadly . . . .”383 He notes, perhaps with glee, that regulations 
are binding on the IRS even as taxpayers are free to challenge them.384 
In its own “Tax Controversy Alert,” a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP 
noted that the arbitrary and capricious requirement “is not a toothless 
throwaway requirement but rather a real and potentially potent method 
of challenging Treasury regulations.”385 And a Florida State law 
professor told the Florida Bar that a “warrior who does not use all 
weapons risks unnecessary defeat” when “encourag[ing] taxpayers’ 
counsel” to make APA challenges.386 In 2016, NYU Law School hosted 
a program on using the APA to challenge IRS guidance and, in 2014, 
Duke Law School held a symposium on applying administrative law in 
tax.387 These issues are not going away. If anything, the need to resolve 
procedural issues will grow. 
B. Sometimes Courts Never Review Procedural Violations 
Despite the likelihood that courts will hear more procedural cases, 
existing statutory and prudential limitations mean that some procedural 
claims can never successfully be presented. As a result, some claims that 
a piece of tax guidance was not created using proper procedures are 
never heard by a court, whether before or after enforcement. This Article 
focuses on two types of guidance that are unlikely to be litigated to 
illustrate these concerns: first, guidance that favors a select group of 
taxpayers, due to issues involving standing; and, second, tax notices that 
                                                     
383. Roger Jones et al., McDermott Will & Emery LLP, How to Challenge Tax Regs on 
Administrative Law Grounds, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/altera-how-to-challenge-tax-regulations-administrative-law-grounds [https://perma.cc/H4TR-
SDMR].  
384. Id. 
385. J. Walker Johnson et al., STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, Tax Controversy Alert, Using the 
Administrative Procedure Act to Challenge Claims that IRS Regulations Are Entitled to Chevron 
Deference (2012), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/4472.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWU3-
WG3N]. 
386. Steve Johnson, Using Administrative Law to Challenge IRS Determinations, 88 FLA. B.J. 
81 (2014). 
387. Using the Administrative Procedure Act to Challenge IRS Guidance, N.Y.U. LAW TAX 
BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/taxblog/2016/02/using-the-administrative-procedure-
act-to-challenge-irs-guidance [https://perma.cc/CWY3-LHPT]; Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and 
Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, DUKE L.J., http://dlj.law.duke.edu/current-
issue/ [https://perma.cc/H82M-V28W]. 
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promise future regulations, due to lack of finality. In both instances, 
procedural claims are not reviewable. 
Looking at the first instance, guidance that favors isolated groups of 
taxpayers is one example of how some procedural issues are unlikely to 
be addressed even if the agency used an undemocratic process in 
creating the guidance. When the government narrowly tailors tax 
reduction for political or administrative reasons, those benefited are 
unlikely to object to the resulting benefit. Even if they wanted to, they 
may be unable to make procedural objections to the way the reduction 
was formulated. For rules that create favorable tax treatment, such as an 
exclusion from tax, there is no enforcement per se, and there is generally 
no injury from the favorable rule. Thus, those that benefit from the rule 
but oppose the procedure are unable to challenge it in court. 
Third party suits to tailored tax benefits are also unlikely. Although 
the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act are unlikely to 
apply as tax preferences are not to raise revenue, as discussed in the 
prior Part,388 Flast has set a high bar for establishing standing in tax 
cases.389 Issues of favoritism are generally deemed political matters. 
Except in extreme circumstances such as in Flast involving First 
Amendment rights, these issues are subject only to congressional review. 
Treasury Department and IRS favoritism in the enforcement of a 
congressional statute might warrant an exception, but one not yet 
created. 
These issues of tax favoritism arise more often than one might think. 
For example, the IRS makes numerous preferential interpretations of the 
Internal Revenue Code, often as a result of concern for the 
administrability of a particular issue, that benefit select groups of 
taxpayers. Lawrence Zelenak refers to these as customary deviations 
from what is required by the Code.390 According to Zelenak, these 
deviations are different from dubious readings of the statutory language 
or from positions contrary to the literal language of the Code but that are 
almost certainly required by courts, such as not taxing imputed 
income.391 Additionally, they are different from simple under-
enforcement without any public indication of that approach, such as the 
IRS not seeking actual tip amounts in excess of eight percent of 
restaurant sales.392 
                                                     
388. See section II.B. 
389. See supra notes 275–68. 
390. Zelenak, supra note 23. 
391. Id. at 833–34. 
392. Id. at 834–35. 
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Consider, for example, the issue of frequent flyer miles. The IRS 
announced that, although technically within the meaning of gross 
income in section 61 of the Code, it would not seek to tax frequent flyer 
miles received for business travel.393 Because a tax is not being applied 
so that no one is taxed as a result of the rule, there is no enforcement to 
trigger a lawsuit. There is no injury in fact for standing. Without the 
lawsuit, the policy of not taxing this fringe benefit cannot be judicially 
challenged. Although this exclusion remains the law, at least one 
exception has been carved out when frequent flyer miles are received for 
opening a bank account, although the rule was instigated more by 
Citibank’s issuance of a Form 1099-MISC than the IRS. The inclusion 
of income was quickly challenged.394 
As another example, the IRS narrowed statutory limits on the 
deductibility of corporate net operating losses and unrealized built-in 
losses following a corporate acquisition.395 The rules are complicated but 
aim to prevent taxpayers from deducting losses after mergers planned to 
traffic in tax deductions. Notice 2008-83 declared that the limits of this 
section would not apply to banks.396 The new rule single-handedly 
permitted mergers between banks to maintain certain loss deductions 
and did so at odds with express statutory prohibitions. The notice was 
issued at the beginning of the Great Recession and immediately prior to 
the bailout of the financial industry.397 This notice facilitated the 
acquisition of Wachovia, a failing bank, by Wells Fargo, one that 
survived the Recession.398 
The favorable impact of Notice 2008-83 on the targeted taxpayers 
was not challengeable in courts. No one had standing to challenge the 
liberalization of the rules that allowed Wells Fargo to buy Wachovia’s 
tax deductions. Political fallout nevertheless occurred. Numerous people 
                                                     
393. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621, discussed in Zelenak, supra note 23, at 831–
32.  
394. Shankar v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 140 (2014); see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Tax Court Sides with 
IRS in Tax Treatment of Frequent Flyer Miles Issued by Citibank, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:35 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/28/tax-court-sides-with-irs-in-tax-
treatment-of-frequent-flyer-miles-issued-by-citibank/ [https://perma.cc/529D-7F3N]. 
395. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905, discussed in Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 Duke L.J. 
ONLINE 53, 88–92 (2015); Zelenak, supra note 23, at 847. 
396. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905. 
397. Id. 
398. Memorandum from Rich Delmar, Counsel to the Inspector Gen., to Eric Thorson, Inspector 
Gen., on Inquiry Regarding IRS Notice 2008-83 (Sept. 3, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/Inquiry%20Regarding%20IRS%20Notice%202008-
83.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EKQ-S5N2]. 
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critiqued the notice.399 It was a significant enough issue that Congress 
responded by enacting legislation that disapproved of Notice 2008-83 as 
“inconsistent with the congressional intent” of section 382 and 
describing the IRS’s authority for the notice as “doubtful.”400 Congress 
focused on concerns of the separation of powers rather than narrow 
procedural matters. Also, undermining this strong rhetorical position 
explicitly stating that the agency had no authority to issue the guidance, 
Congress acknowledged that taxpayers need to be able to rely on IRS 
guidance. Congress permitted taxpayers to rely on the notice for 
ownership changes that occurred before January 17, 2009, the date the 
legislation was enacted.401 Not to be deterred, in 2010, the IRS issued 
Notice 2010-2, declaring that section 382 would not apply if the 
Treasury Department were to sell its shares, presumably of General 
Motors, to the public.402 It has not been overturned.403 
Favorable agency action, such as with respect to frequent flyer miles 
or net operating losses, published through the issuance of notices that do 
not receive public feedback in a notice-and-comment process are 
particularly troubling. The agency is creating law, which may be a valid 
use of its delegated authority under section 7805. However, in doing so 
the agency should take the requisite steps to write that law in the process 
designed for such activity by Congress. In other words, to maintain our 
democratic system, when the public does not participate through 
Congress in the making of exceptions to the tax law, the public should 
be able to participate through notice-and-comment in order to maintain 
agency accountability to the people. 
It is difficult to fix this problem of lack of accountability for tax 
favoritism. Arguably litigation over favorable rules is not prohibited by 
the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act because these 
exceptions reduce, rather than increase, tax revenue. However, because 
                                                     
399. Nathaniel Cushman, Comment, The Impact of Illegal Tax Guidance: Notice 2008-83, 62 
TAX LAW. 867 (2009); Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/11/09/AR2008110902155.html [https://perma.cc/Q6JE-ZTAS] (citing 
interviews with a dozen tax lawyers); Tax Policy: Treasury Should Have Consulted Congress 
Before Giving Banks Breaks, Grassley Says, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 14, 2008, at 
G-1. 
400. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat. 
115, 342–43. 
401. Id. 
402. Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251. 
403. Senate Bill 2916 would have nullified Notice 2010-2; however, it died in committee. S.B. 
2916 111th Cong., Reg. Sess. (2009). 
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these notices favor the taxpayer at whom they are aimed, no one is in a 
position to challenge them in court other than as a third-party claim.404 
Moreover, because they are favorable to the taxpayer, they must be 
challenged before enforcement, or the challenge has little effect. 
Challenges occurring after their effective date would likely be after those 
benefited submitted tax returns, so that remedies would likely only be 
prospective.405 Although this would be better than the current system, 
even better solutions should be found. 
A second group of tax guidance for which procedural claims are 
unlikely to be heard is guidance that operates against taxpayers, but the 
guidance is not, strictly speaking, a final rule forcing taxpayer action. 
For example, some IRS Notices, which are arguably not final rules so 
not subject to challenge, alert taxpayers to potential enforcement activity 
and are intended to influence taxpayer behavior.406 If determined to be 
final, the guidance would increase a taxpayer’s tax obligation and thus 
raise Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act limits to pre-
enforcement litigation. However, if found to be a final rule, the 
prohibition on litigation becomes a timing issue. Procedural claims could 
be raised after enforcement. If the IRS uses the notice as part of its 
justification for the tax assessment, courts could hear procedural claims 
against the specific guidance because the guidance is used to cause the 
harm of the tax assessment. An issue remains whether the notice is final 
because its application appears final, even if a notice does not purport to 
be. 
For example, the IRS not infrequently issues notices warning of 
potential action, such as “to relate what regulations will say in situations 
where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future.”407 
Returning to the issue of the inversion regulations, before the final 
regulations were issued in 2016, the IRS issued Notice 2014-52 on 
September 22, 2014, and amended the notice with Notice 2015-79 on 
November 19, 2015.408 The notices contained rules in the form of 
regulations but only announced that the Treasury Department “intends to 
                                                     
404. Taxpayer advocates or tax clinics are natural advocates over these issues. 
405. There are good reasons that taxpayers filing tax returns should be able to rely on 
government guidance outstanding at the date of filing and, practically, these taxpayers’ statute of 
limitations is likely to have lapsed before litigation over procedure is complete. 
406. This attempt to influence may be particularly troubling because of the tax system’s stated 
reliance on voluntary compliance. 
407. Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://perma.cc/R2ZE-E45S].  
408. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, modified by Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; see 
also T.D. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 20858 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
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issue” regulations to reduce the benefit of inversion transactions and 
requested public comments. Thus, the language was a basis for 
regulations but failed to be published to initiate formal notice-and-
comment. 
These notices were expressly intended to provide awareness of the 
issue and potential future actions of the IRS; however, it is hard to 
believe they were not also intended to stop these types of transactions. 
The notices also limited companies’ ability to claim certain tax benefits 
if they undertake inversions after the notice was released. This raises 
companies’ risk of challenging the rules at the same time that it 
minimizes chances of procedural challenges. With this method of 
announcing proposed regulations without following the prescribed 
publication, the agency failed to meet the requirements for beginning 
notice-and-comment. Nevertheless, the notices’ Fact Sheet announced 
the proposal as having full force of law and the regulations were 
expected to apply to transactions completed on or after the publication of 
the notices.409 
As another example, the IRS issues notices putting transactions on a 
list of transactions that impose reporting and penalty burdens. Although 
classification as a listed transaction does not impose a tax itself, its 
burdens are intended to affect taxpayer behavior. As a listed transaction, 
taxpayers who have entered into these types of transactions are required 
to disclose those transactions and their advisors may be subject to 
registration and required to maintain lists.410 
One of the many listed transactions was designated as such in 2015 
when the IRS issued notices on certain contracts it viewed as abusive.411 
The IRS designated certain “basket option contracts” as listed 
transactions and other “basket contracts” as transactions of interest. The 
IRS was concerned that these contracts have the potential for tax 
avoidance because they may result in the improper deferral of income or 
improper categorization of income as long-term capital gain. In 
particular, the IRS focused on contracts that do not hold static assets, so 
that the referenced property changes over time, and in which the 
taxpayer or designee has some amount of control over the components 
of the underlying contract. Although the IRS admitted not having 
                                                     
409. Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2645.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/H6JM-2J8Z]. 
410. I.R.C. §§ 1.6011-4, 6111, 6112 (2012). 
411. Notice 2015-73, 2015-46 I.R.B. 660, Notice 2015-74, 2015-46 I.R.B. 663, revoking Notice 
2015-47, 2015-30 I.R.B. 76, Notice 2015-48, 2015-30 I.R.B. 77. 
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sufficient information about basket contracts to determine whether they 
should be identified as tax avoidance transactions, the IRS required they 
be disclosed and the IRS retained discretion to remove these transactions 
from the list after more information is gathered. 
These notices were not unexpected. The IRS issued a legal advice 
memorandum in 2010 challenging the contracts’ characterization as 
options for tax purposes and the Senate has critiqued their use.412 
However, within months of issuing the notices the IRS had issued new 
notices, revoking the old ones. The new notices provided greater detail 
and discussion of the types of transactions to be covered but created a 
trail of law that is harder to follow than would have been necessary if all 
of the information had been in the first issuance. And that trail was 
created without formal public input. 
Following a contract’s designation as a listed transaction, if the IRS 
chooses to enforce failure to comply with the listed transaction rules, 
then the punishment would open the door to a procedural challenge.413 
However, penalties are not the only goal of designating activities as 
listed transactions. As the law firm Mayer Brown notes,  
Historically, the IRS has used the reportable transaction 
disclosure regime not only as a warning to taxpayers . . . who are 
considering engaging in the transactions, but also as a means to 
collect preliminary information to aid in the future examination 
of taxpayers that have already implemented the structures.414  
To the extent the IRS accomplishes its objective without imposing the 
penalty, the notice is not reviewable. 
Despite the existence of this information-gathering objective, 
taxpayers are unlikely to be able to challenge the procedure behind the 
creation of these rules until the IRS enforces them against a taxpayer.415 
The Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act almost certainly 
will be held to prohibit review because the rules are closely tied to the 
                                                     
412. Office of Chief Counsel, IRM, to Area Counsel, Hedge Fund Basket Option Contracts, 
A.M. 2010-005, Oct. 15, 2010; Senate, Permanent Subcomm. on Invest., Abuse of Structured 
Financial Products, at 6–8 (July 22, 2014). 
413. I.R.C. § 6707A (2012). 
414. Out-of-the-Money: The IRS Designates Basket Options as Listed Transactions and 
Transactions of Interest, MAYER BROWN (July 24, 2015), https://m.mayerbrown.com/files/ 
Publication/4f8936ef-7748-4fdd-9ce4-1160ee83be65/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
20ea76ae-2f3d-442c-afcc-2351b96b8687/150716-UPDATE-CHI-Tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/35AL-
97T2]. 
415. This concern was also noticed by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Challenging 
the IRS Anti-Inversion Notice: A Hollow Threat (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/ 
challenging-irs-anti-inversion-notice-hollow-threat [https://perma.cc/ZB74-84LK]. 
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“assessment and collection” of federal revenue. Moreover, even with a 
claim that the notices violate the APA, it is unlikely a court would find 
this type of notice “a final agency action” under section 704 as is 
necessary to give rise to APA review. 
What is more troubling is the extent to which guidance may alert 
taxpayers of future changes in regulations and, therefore, change 
behavior but may not be used for enforcement. For example, the IRS 
sometimes issues notices warning of future regulations that may or may 
not ever be issued. To the extent taxpayers voluntarily comply with the 
notice, if only because of the threat that future regulations will be 
retroactive back to the notice, it has changed behavior in the same way 
as would an enforceable rule. However, the notice is arguably not 
subject to review. With a significant exercise of government power, a 
practical but not justiciable injury is caused. 
Similar problems of changing taxpayer behavior without the public’s 
input in the formation of the rule exist with the issuance of temporary 
regulations. Temporary regulations often have effective dates as of their 
issuance although proposed regulations are simultaneously proceeding 
through notice-and-comment. These temporary regulations are only 
somewhat more likely to be reviewed by courts than are notices. Kristin 
Hickman notes how temporary regulations are unlikely to face 
successful challenge because they will be turned into permanent 
regulations before litigation is complete.416 Litigation is often slow, but 
the process of taking regulations from temporary to final “usually takes 
about a year.”417 
The procedural problem could render the succeeding regulations 
invalid, but that is not always the case.418 For many courts, whether to 
overturn the final regulations depends upon whether the agency kept an 
“open mind” when considering comments or demonstrated its 
responsiveness to the public.419 Michael Asimow, for one, criticizes the 
invalidation of a rule that completes notice-and-comment just because a 
prior one failed to do so.420 Nevertheless, without some consequence to 
                                                     
416. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1190–91. 
417. Id.  
418. Fed. Express Corp. v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Mortg. Inv’rs Corp. of 
Ohio v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 
F.2d 752, 767–68 (3d Cir. 1982). 
419. Gober, 220 F.3d at 1379; Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 
28 F.3d 1288, 1292–93 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983). 
420.  Asimow, supra note 74, at 725–27. Although forms of guidance other than regulations are 
often issued by the IRS, they do not go through notice and comment on the grounds they are 
interpretive, and it is questionable whether they would survive a challenge under the APA. Rulings 
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using temporary regulations, the agency is likely to continue changing 
public behavior before the public has the opportunity to comment. 
The issue of using notices to affect taxpaying behavior may better be 
left to Congress than the courts. In particular when the notices extend tax 
preferences rather than threaten penalties, the ability may be the heart of 
agency discretion, especially when the alternative is difficult to 
administer. Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein argue that the Treasury 
Department has a long-standing policy of not enforcing the gross income 
provision of the Code to its fullest as a matter of agency discretion.421 
Arguing that this approach is the response of conscientious 
administrators to practical problems, these authors would likely 
(although it is unknown for certain) not want to turn this administrative 
power over to courts who may be less concerned with issues of 
valuation, liquidity, enforceability, and public understanding. Through 
its exercise of discretion in the form of notices, the agency can address 
concerns quickly and efficiently. 
The underlying problem, at least for this Article, is not the subject 
matter of these rules but that the IRS’s method of extending these 
benefits and these burdens does not provide the public an opportunity to 
comment. Because these rules do not originate in Congress, there is no 
democratic oversight in the traditional sense. Even when Congress 
becomes engaged in an issue, as it did with net operating losses, the 
legislative fix is generally to substantive matters rather than procedural 
concerns. As a result, tax law is being created behind closed doors. To 
make matters worse, under the current legislative and prudential 
restrictions on tax litigation, the process is unlikely to be subject to 
judicial review. 
C. Specific Problems with Denying Early Review 
The timing for when courts review procedural claims over tax 
guidance is problematic. This Part explores some of the problems caused 
by this litigation occurring after enforcement but does not seek to cover 
them all. The problems range from those imposed on individual 
taxpayers, who may or may not owe more in tax, to those imposed on 
society as a whole. The tax system loses consistency as its guidance is 
                                                     
have less weight than regulations but, according to the IRS, “may be used as precedents” by both 
taxpayers and the IRS. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; I.R.M. 
§ 32.2.2.10. 
421. I.R.C. § 61 (2012); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. 
TAX REV. 295 (2011). 
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challenged and possibly overturned, and faith in the tax system may be 
compromised. Pre-enforcement litigation of procedure would not fix all 
of these problems but would mitigate many of their costs. 
The problems created by procedural deficiencies in the tax context are 
not new and have already received significant attention by the academic 
community. Michael Asimow claimed in 1991 that the Treasury 
Department’s procedures “leave[] in doubt the validity of numerous 
temporary and final regulations . . . .”422 Kristin Hickman has written 
about ten articles, many of which are quoted herein, on the issue of 
Treasury Department and IRS compliance with the APA. With respect to 
the issuance of binding temporary regulations with the simultaneous 
issuance of proposed regulations for notice-and-comment, Juan Vasquez 
and Peter Lowy described this as “obliterat[ing] the APA’s notice-and-
comment procedures.”423 John Coverdale questioned “what justification 
the Treasury believes it has for not using notice and comment . . . .”424 
Juan Lavilla called the Department’s actions “particularly remarkable” 
when compared with other agencies.425 
Although there is pushback to the wholesale importation of the APA 
into taxation, the perception of agency abuse alone should be sufficient 
to demand action.426 However, delaying litigation over procedural 
matters until after enforcement, as required by the statutory prohibitions 
and common law, makes it less likely that these claims will be brought, 
thereby strengthening critics’ claims. Even though the agency created 
neither cause of the deferral—the statutory or prudential limitations—it 
is often blamed for the lateness of the litigation.427 
A chief problem with the timing of litigation is that it necessarily 
limits who can bring suit. Only those taxpayers found in violation of the 
tax guidance and who do not settle their tax liability are able to 
challenge the procedures behind the creation of the guidance. To reach a 
stage that permits this litigation first requires exhausting administrative 
                                                     
422. Asimow, supra note 73, at 369–70. 
423. Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations: An 
Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and 
Invalidity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248, 253 (2003); see also Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, 
supra note 8, at 1160. 
424. John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations 
and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 69 (2003). 
425. Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 341 (1989). 
426. See supra note 8. 
427. Id.  
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avenues to redress the substantive tax issues.428 Following audit and a 
determination of deficiency, the taxpayer must challenge the result in the 
IRS’s Appeals Office before being able to proceed to court.429 To choose 
litigation to permit a court to hear procedural claims, the taxpayer would 
forego the option of settlement in either audit or on administrative 
appeal. If the taxpayer raised and won the issue in settlement, 
settlements are confidential, as are tax returns.430 Thus, with both 
administrative resolution and settlement, the matter is closed without 
establishing precedent. 
The structure of litigation also means that those who do not owe tax 
have very few options for challenging guidance’s procedures, and not 
owing tax may result from the IRS’s failure to audit for particular 
issues.431 Instead, taxpayers who may be willing to challenge the 
procedures behind the creation of rules must wait until they are, if ever, 
assessed penalties. If the IRS does not audit the issue, the procedural 
claim may never be litigated. With the audit rate currently less than one 
percent, although higher for certain categories of taxpayers, it is likely 
many issues that could provoke challenge are not given an opportunity 
for review.432 Consequently, assuming compliance imposes some cost on 
complying taxpayers, those who comply will be at a disadvantage 
compared to those who do not. 
In addition, the delay in litigation reduces the value of successful 
claims. What most taxpayers may gain in litigation is unlikely to offset 
the expense of the litigation itself. For example, because of the limited 
benefit of potential remedies the court could impose, Kristin Hickman 
points out that taxpayers might feel that challenging temporary 
regulations “is a futile act not worth the effort.”433 Because taxpayers 
cannot use class actions in tax litigation over tax liability because of the 
                                                     
428. Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 1999); Brennan v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
134 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1998); Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1997). 
429.  First, if the taxpayer does not pay the liability determined to be owed the taxpayer can 
pursue deficiency litigation in the Tax Court. I.R.C. §§ 6211(a), 6212(a), 6213(a) (2012). 
Alternatively, a taxpayer can pay the tax the IRS determines is owed and seek a refund. This 
subjects the taxpayer “to an equivalent to an audit” as the case proceeds in the appropriate District 
Court or the Court of Claims. I.R.C. § 7422(a); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 
1184–85. 
430. I.R.C. § 6103(a). For more on the play of confidentiality, see Hickman, A Problem of 
Remedy, supra note 8, at 1185–87. 
431. Debt Buyers’ Ass’n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2006). 
432. SOI Stats—Examination Coverage—Individual Income Tax Returns Examined, I.R.S. 
(2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-examination-coverage-individual-income-tax-returns-
examined-irs-data-book-table-9b [https://perma.cc/VP25-7EAX]. 
433. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1193, 1206. 
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individualized results post-assessment, even if the issue has a small 
impact on many taxpayers, spreading the cost of tax suits is difficult.434 
Thus, there might be little incentive to fight how guidance is made. 
Disincentives are increased because, unlike in other areas of law that 
permit pre-enforcement litigation, people are not suing in post-
enforcement tax litigation simply to perfect the agency’s procedures. 
Instead, they are suing over their own tax obligations. The personal 
nature of the result and that the costs are already imposed likely changes 
the way people perceive the litigation. With pre-enforcement litigation, a 
judge remanding a case to the agency to correct the procedures would be 
a victory. In a tax refund or deficiency case, remand is insufficient to 
accomplish the goal of reducing the taxes owed. If courts are likely to 
remand procedural matters without vacating the rule, the taxpayer has 
little incentive to challenge the rules because the personal outcome 
remains the same. 
These limits on litigation reduce the voices that are heard in matters 
of tax procedure and the substance of the rules themselves. Eliminating a 
check to ensure compliance with notice-and-comment potentially loses 
the voices of lower-income and less well-connected individuals because 
these groups are unlikely to have other routes to influence the Treasury 
Department.435 There is no guarantee these groups would claim the 
opportunity to engage in procedural litigation or to participate in notice-
and-comment; however, any future absence is no reason to foreclose the 
possibility. It may speak to a need to permit organizations to litigate and 
advocate on these groups’ behalf. Organizations exist to help taxpayers 
with the tax filing and audit processes, and they may bring procedural 
claims in the process of enforcement. Although currently foreclosed 
from doing so, these organizations should be empowered to engage in 
pre-enforcement litigation and the submission of comments that would 
aid their constituents prospectively.436 
                                                     
434. Norton, supra note 169 at 624. Taxpayers may seek representative suits, but even if the IRS 
loses, the IRS may not acquiesce to the judgment. Unless the Supreme Court decides an issue, the 
IRS is free to continue fighting. Id. It is possible to have class action lawsuits over other regulatory 
matters; for example, there is a class action suit regarding preparer tax identification numbers. See 
Alistair M. Nevius, PTIN Class Action Lawsuit Affects All Tax Return Preparers, J. ACCOUNTANCY 
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2016/oct/ptin-class-action-lawsuit-
201615343.html [https://perma.cc/7Q8Q-VJKP]. 
435. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
414, 460–61 (2005); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1205–06. 
436. Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing 
Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 554 (2012). 
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Until someone is willing and able to litigate procedural issues, people 
are forced to operate under rules that might have procedural 
imperfections that would nullify the rule. This means that during the life 
of the guidance, taxpayers must evaluate the law’s substance plus its 
procedural history as they plan their tax lives. This is an undue burden 
on taxpayers and, as Richard Pierce warns, the lack of pre-enforcement 
review may “induce regulatees to comply with a rule, even if they 
believe the rule to be invalid, rather than to take the risks attendant to 
noncompliance and a subsequent challenge to the validity of the rule in 
an enforcement case.”437 Taxpayers must evaluate procedure despite 
courts not applying consistent standards in their evaluation, making it 
more difficult for non-experts to do so, especially without the judiciary 
acting as referee. 
The evaluation process is complicated by the possibility that a court 
will apply Chevron deference if the court gets past procedural concerns. 
With Chevron deference, courts defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.438 Therefore, if a taxpayer 
misjudges a procedural issue, the taxpayer faces the prospect of the court 
deferring to the rule even if it is not the best interpretation of the statute. 
However, notwithstanding its broad language, Chevron is not 
consistently applied.439 Courts do not clearly or consistently apply any of 
the deference standards, and scholars debate the effect deference has on 
the outcome of cases.440 
In particular with respect to tax cases, Chevron deference has not 
always resulted in victory for the government. Although courts defer to 
the Treasury Department regarding tax matters more than most other 
agencies receive deference for other issues, courts do not defer nearly as 
                                                     
437. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 
90 (1995); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An 
Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 
100–01 (1997). 
438. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
439. Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 
(2005); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271 (2008); Mark Seidenfeld, 
Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273 (2011).  
440. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. 
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 568–69 (2006); 
Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1898–99 (2006); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative 
Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States 
v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 325–28 (2002); Zaring, supra note 135 at 170–76. 
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often to the IRS.441 Even for the Treasury Department, deference is far 
from guaranteed. For example, in 2012, in United States v. Home 
Concrete & Supply, LLC,442 the Supreme Court reviewed final 
regulations extending the statute of limitations in a way that applied to a 
well-known abusive tax shelter.443 Based on judicial precedent, the Court 
found there was no statutory ambiguity and therefore no need to defer to 
the Treasury Department.444 Congress has since changed the statute to 
overturn Home Concrete.445 
Similarly, in 2014, in King v. Burwell,446 the Supreme Court refused 
to defer to Treasury Department regulations interpreting provisions of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.447 Despite finding the 
language ambiguous, the first step of Chevron, the Court then interpreted 
the provision in a manner “that is compatible with the rest of the law.”448 
Sidestepping Chevron, the Court created its own operational rules on the 
grounds that, if Congress wanted to assign such power over the new 
healthcare system to the agency, Congress “surely would have done so 
expressly.”449 
Therefore, taxpayers face uncertain outcomes and a level of judicial 
deference for challenging what they believe are inadequate procedures. 
They risk financial penalties to do so; however, to receive statutory 
penalties, taxpayers’ arguments would need to be very weak. The IRS 
may impose penalties if a taxpayer fails to follow guidance, even for 
guidance that the Treasury Department claims is interpretive and not 
subject to notice-and-comment.450 However, the application of penalties 
depends upon the type of guidance and the taxpayer’s reasons for failing 
to follow them. In other words, a reasonable argument for failing to 
follow the regulation will not incur penalties. In addition to potential 
penalties, interest accrues during periods of dispute over the procedures 
                                                     
441. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 48–49, 51). 
442. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), superseded by statute, Surface Transportation and 
Veterans Healthcare Choice Improvement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–41, § 2005, 129 Stat. 443, 
456–57 (2015). 
443. Id. at 1839. 
444. Id. at 1844.  
445. § 2005, 129 Stat. 443, 456–57. 
446. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
447. Id. at 2489.  
448. Id. at 2492 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). 
449. Id. at 2489. 
450. I.R.C. § 6662 (2012). 
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(as well as substantive disagreements), payable only if the taxpayer loses 
the challenge. Although interest and penalties may toll at various times 
in the assessment process and during collection proceedings, they 
generally accrue during administrative challenge.451 
If taxpayers are willing to face these ambiguities and costs, under 
current law there is a time limit on how long they can make procedural 
challenges, if only the government remembers to raise the statute of 
limitations. In general, procedural challenges are limited by the six-year 
general federal statute of limitations unless a statutory grant prescribes a 
different time frame.452 Underlying this limitation is “a concern for the 
agency’s interest in prompt review and the public’s settled expectations 
regarding agency action.”453 Courts have also held that failure to engage 
in notice-and-comment does not represent a continuing violation of the 
APA.454 This statute of limitations is often held not to be jurisdictional, 
and some courts have pointed out that the government often fails to 
make the claim.455 
Despite the statute of limitations, there remain loopholes within the 
statute of limitations that would permit the invalidation of regulations on 
procedural grounds at any time. For example, the general federal statute 
of limitations is extended for three years after a potential litigant is no 
longer “beyond the seas” or under “legal disability.”456 There is also the 
issue of when the period starts. For procedural matters, the statute of 
limitations begins when the rule becomes final; for substantive matters, 
timing is based on when the agency applies the rule to the challenger.457 
However, in addition, for many rules, the statute of limitations applies 
after applying the doctrines of finality, ripeness, and exhaustion, which 
may be long after publication.458 In Hudson v. Federal Aviation 
Administration,459 the court held that a statutory sixty-day statute of 
limitations did not limit challenges to a notice because the notice was not 
ripe until it was applied in order to allow courts a better opportunity to 
                                                     
451. Id. § 6601(a), (b)(5). 
452. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012). 
453. Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 2006). 
454. Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
455. Schiller, 449 F.3d at 294; Rocky Mountain Wild v. Walsh, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1246 (D. 
Colo. 2016); see also Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009). 
456. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012). 
457. Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
458. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.7 (5th ed. 2010). 
459. 192 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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understand its meaning.460 Moreover, late claims are sometimes 
permitted. For example, it is possible to petition an agency for 
amendment or rescission of the rule and then appeal, although this is less 
likely to be successful for purely procedural claims.461 Thus, the window 
under the general statute of limitations is not as limiting as one might 
suppose. 
Although it is uncertain what remedies courts will devise for 
successful procedural claims, one option is to vacate the guidance. This 
would nullify the guidance for all taxpayers retroactively. Because the 
agency retains discretion to create a new rule using appropriate 
procedure, courts cannot simply substitute a rule for the litigating 
taxpayers so that the taxpayer and others in a similar position are in a tax 
limbo, potentially hoping for the lapse of the permissible collection 
period. To the extent vacatur occurs, tax law loses valuable consistency 
because rules may change long after their issuance. This may also 
exacerbate differences between those who voluntarily complied with the 
law and those who either ignored it or planned for the challenge. 
An alternative approach is to remand the guidance so that it is 
changed only prospectively. However, remanding guidance works 
poorly when the litigation occurs after enforcement action has 
commenced because the court is dealing with a real taxpayer who needs 
to know an actual tax result. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated in a 
non-tax case that it did not impose its own interpretation because 
“Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a 
statute will be resolved by the implementing agency.”462 
A reviewing court can order an agency to provide the relief it 
denied only in the unusual case where the court concludes that 
the underlying law and facts are such that the agency has no 
discretion to act in any other manner, and then only when the 
court concludes that a remand to the agency would produce 
substantial injustice in the form of further delay of action to 
which the petition is clearly entitled.463 
                                                     
460. Id. at 1034–35. 
461. O’REILLY, supra note 125, § 15.14. “[C]hallenges to the procedural lineage of agency 
regulations, whether raised by direct appeal, by petition for amendment or rescission of the 
regulation or as a defense to an agency enforcement proceeding, will not be entertained outside the 
60–day period provided by statute.” JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
462. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999), quoted in Hickman, A Problem 
of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1195 n.191. 
463. PIERCE, JR., supra note 458, § 18.1. 
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Therefore, generally courts cannot direct the agency’s actions because 
under our separated powers system the agency must create the law. 
Consequently, when enforcement has begun, remand for the agency to 
create a new rule poorly addresses the problem for the complaining 
taxpayer. 
Between the difficulty of bringing procedural claims and the lack of 
value to a litigant who is successful, there is a narrow funnel through 
which procedural claims must flow. The result is that these cases may be 
more of a distraction than a true means of remedying procedural 
inadequacies. The better result may either be to eliminate such 
challenges by carving tax out of the APA or to permit litigation over 
procedural matters before the guidance is enforced. In addition, the tax 
context may necessitate more immediate judicial relief than remand 
when cases are brought post-enforcement. To gain greater judicial 
direction, Congress would need to extend to courts the express power to 
do so.464 
The current regime also poses the risk that, as taxpayers learn of 
procedural ambiguities and their own inability to challenge the agency’s 
procedures, taxpayers may lose faith in the tax system and that, in turn, 
may hurt compliance.465 This is not to suggest that permitting the public 
to comment on tax guidance will increase taxpayers’ affection for the tax 
system. However, foreclosing their voice may have the opposite effect. 
Additionally, asking the public not to comply with rules issued by the 
IRS or the Treasury Department in order to create a legal basis for a 
challenge may threaten the voluntary, compliant tax system. The system 
must encourage compliance when possible, so courts telling people to 
deliberately fail to comply hoping to be assessed to permit a challenge to 
the assessment is antithetical to the system. 
                                                     
464. A similar circumstance could be cases involving the denial of Social Security benefits in 
which courts occasionally order the agency to take specific action rather than reconsider its 
decision. In Social Security cases, however, the statute provides courts explicit authority to 
“affirm[], modify[], or revers[e] the decision . . . with or without remanding the cause for a 
rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012) (cited in Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 
1195 n.193). 
465. I.R.S. OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 19 (2010) (finding it is 
important to taxpayers that the I.R.S. fairly enforce tax laws); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay 
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1497–99 (2003) 
(stating that punishing free-riders in the context of public goods may help maintain voluntary 
contributions); Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions 
and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 193, 194–95 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (noting that perception of general tax 
compliance is important to individual compliance decisions). 
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IV. PROPOSALS THAT BALANCE POLICY CONCERNS 
If courts permit procedural challenges to tax guidance, this litigation 
should occur before the guidance is enforced against taxpayers. 
Although this would likely increase the cost of tax administration, it 
would improve the law’s consistency and better manage the use of the 
agency’s limited resources. Under current rules, pre-enforcement 
litigation is rare because of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, and prudential justiciability constraints. This Part 
proposes that Congress enact narrow statutory changes to the Anti-
Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act to funnel procedural 
litigation before the application of tax guidance. Although this proposal 
does not perfectly address all concerns about the Treasury Department’s 
and the IRS’s failure to follow APA procedures, it balances concerns 
regarding good procedure and good administration of the tax system. 
The two changes proposed in this Article are premised on the 
assumption that procedural litigation will occur. Proper procedure 
provides the agency and the public the opportunity for voices to be heard 
but does not guarantee a change in the agency’s position. Those voices 
may, however, change the shape of rules by influencing the way the 
agency understands the issues. Because the voices only have the power 
to persuade and to create a record for litigation, the timing of those 
voices is critical to maximize their value. If a court or Congress carves 
tax out of the APA, thus denying procedural constraints on agency 
action, these proposals would be moot. 
Together these two proposals remove the statutory block to pre-
enforcement litigation and strengthen the case for finality and injuries in 
fact. The first is a narrow amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to permit procedural litigation before the 
guidance’s enforcement. The second proposal legislates the finality of 
notices and recognizes the harm to non-recipient taxpayers from 
narrowly tailored and exclusive favorable tax provisions. The first 
proposal may operate to limit procedural litigation even as the second 
operates to expand it. They seek to balance the best use of government 
resources for all taxpayers. To do so, these proposals require 
congressional action, something that is far from assured in today’s 
political environment. Nevertheless, they are an important step in 
recognizing that courts cannot make consistent progress in this area 
without greater assistance from the legislature. 
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A. Narrow Exemption to Keep the Default 
Congress intended the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to support the government’s need to “raise revenue for 
public purposes in the face of citizen recalcitrance;” therefore, any 
exception to their prohibitions must be evaluated, at least in part, for the 
extent to which the exception risks revenue.466 Procedural litigation 
before tax enforcement minimally slows the IRS’s collection processes, 
reducing revenue. To minimize revenue loss, exceptions permitting this 
early litigation must be narrowly drawn and, ideally, facilitate 
enforcement after the litigation. To accomplish both objectives, this 
section proposes Congress narrowly amend the Anti-Injunction Act and 
the Declaratory Judgment Act to permit procedural litigation within a 
finite number of days, for example ninety days, after tax guidance’s 
publication.467 Thereafter, procedural challenges would be foreclosed. 
To resolve the issues discussed in this Article without opening 
floodgates to litigation with unknown consequences, this exception to 
current statutory prohibitions on pre-enforcement litigation for the 
“assessment and collection of taxes” is limited to the Treasury 
Department’s and the IRS’s compliance with the APA in the creation of 
tax guidance. In other words, this proposal would permit pre-
enforcement litigation of procedural requirements and a judicial 
evaluation of whether the process used, including the clarity of the 
statement and the comment period, suffices for APA purposes. For 
example, commentators who felt the Treasury Department did not 
properly respond to their comments could begin litigation of that matter 
before the guidance is enforced. 
In its limited form, this proposal purposefully does not repeal the Tax 
Anti-Injunction Act or the tax exception in the Declaratory Judgment 
Act. Instead of a wholesale change with unknowable effects, this 
proposal limits the change to manage the risk of new litigation. The 
agency has faced significant charges within the last decade, and as it 
faces the demand to incorporate the APA more fully into its creation of 
tax guidance, new burdens need to be circumspectly added. Thus, this 
proposal urges moderation even as it advocates for important changes. 
                                                     
466. Asofsky, supra note 158, at 787. 
467. Making wholesale changes to the standard would require crafting a line that other courts 
would need to respect. Alternatively, courts would throw open the doors to tax litigation, something 
they are unlikely to want to do based on their historic views of tax litigation, and something that is 
dangerous at a time of an underfunded agency to fight that litigation. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or 
Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518, 525–26 
(1994); Temkin, supra note 19. 
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While addressing pressing concerns, the proposal also forces 
congressional discussion of its expectations of administrative agencies. 
Through debates over this statutory change, Congress would have to 
define the extent to which it wants the Treasury Department and the IRS 
to comply with the APA and, possibly, determine if there are acceptable 
differences between the many types of tax guidance. Considering that an 
open-ended statement permitting pre-enforcement litigation over APA 
compliance may expand notice-and-comment to every facet of agency 
life, it may not be unreasonable to expect Congress to take seriously the 
need to weigh when procedure is most valuable. This line drawing is 
difficult but not impossible.468 
There is precedent for narrow exceptions permitting pre-enforcement 
review similar to those proposed in this Article. To date, however, these 
exceptions have focused on substantive law issues. For example, the 
Revenue Act of 1978 made available declaratory judgments to 
prospective issuers of certain government obligations.469 Positing an 
“actual controversy” to determine whether state or local debt obligations 
that are not yet issued are taxable rather than tax-exempt, the Tax Court 
is granted the power to declare whether they are, or are not, tax-
exempt.470 Not only is the subject matter limited, only the prospective 
issuer can bring the suit and must first exhaust administrative 
remedies.471 Finally, there is a ninety-one-day deadline for filing suit 
after the IRS mails the determination letter to the state.472 This grants the 
Tax Court jurisdiction, but not without limits, to hear South Carolina v. 
Regan-type cases. 
Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974473 
granted the Tax Court the limited power to grant declaratory judgments 
for certain issues relating to the qualification of select retirement 
plans.474 Although requiring a case or controversy, this narrow exception 
                                                     
468. For example, with respect to the Tax Injunction Act, which applies to lower federal courts’ 
review of state tax law, courts persist in drawing distinctions between revenue raising and revenue 
losing issues, the latter being subject to pre-enforcement review. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 
108–09 (2004); Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1986); Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d 74, 77 
(2d Cir. 1975). State level claims permit only constitutional challenges, as there is no equivalent to 
the APA to require certain procedure. 
469. Internal Revenue Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 336, 92 Stat. 2841, 2841–42 (1978) 
(codified at I.R.C. § 7478 (2012)). 
470. Id.  
471. I.R.C. § 7478(b).  
472. Id.  
473. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 949 (1974). 
474. Id. § 1041(a), 88 Stat. at 950, (codified at I.R.C. § 7476 (2012)).  
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permits the court to evaluate the merits of an issue to aid in the creation 
of retirement plans but only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
In some ways broader than the exception for tax-exempt bonds, any 
interested party under the regulations can pursue this claim. By creating 
this type of review, Congress permits those who are interested to seek 
resolution of matters before enforcement occurs. 
In the form of a narrow exception, the language proposed in this 
Article would reduce the importance of defining the assessment and 
collection of taxes.475 Today, as shown in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. 
Brohl,476 judges who want to hear procedural claims must fit the 
substance of the guidance outside of the assessment and collection of 
taxes in order to gain jurisdiction.477 This alternate path of redefining 
terms risks broadening the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction and 
Declaratory Judgment Acts, not only for procedural claims but for all 
claims. In the process, courts might open Pandora’s box to litigation in a 
way that thwarts the revenue-raising objectives of these acts. A narrow 
statutorily defined exception acknowledges Congress’s goals without the 
risk of unleashing havoc on tax administration. 
By expanding review from current law, the proposal risks reducing 
the issuance of rules; however, the alternative of delaying litigation 
encourages the creation of rules that may be overturned by courts.478 The 
only real advantage of delaying litigation is if the litigation never occurs. 
To prefer that result, one must accept that the existence of guidance is 
more important than that it be formed consistent with APA procedures, 
in which case Congress should except tax from the APA. If APA 
procedures matter in tax, there must be a method to ensure that the 
procedure is followed. 
                                                     
475. Limiting the language to the narrow processes of assessment and collection as suggested by 
the court in Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 3 (2015) would put tremendous pressure on these 
terms as used in the processes of the Internal Revenue Code as it now operates, because those terms 
were not so narrowly confided in 1867 when the Anti-Injunction Act was first enacted. Hickman 
suggests that courts interpret the “purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax” as 
more specifically and temporally proximate “assessment” and “collection” of taxes. Hickman, A 
Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1210. Hickman recognizes this might “push[] the pendulum 
again back too far in favor of judicial review.” Id. at 1213. 
476. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). 
477. Id. at 1133. 
478. See supra note 60. Not everyone agrees that ossification occurs. Even if ossification 
produces less guidance, reducing the amount of guidance may be necessary to ensure judicial 
scrutiny of agency action. See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A 
Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667 (1996); Thomas O. 
Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 
ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997); Seidenfeld, supra note 437. 
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Because this proposed exception, although narrow, would open up the 
government to new litigation claims, limits on the litigation need to be 
imposed to ensure these claims do not become overly burdensome to the 
tax system. Moreover, these claims need to be constrained in order to 
ensure the consistency of the law. Permitting unlimited procedural 
challenges keeps the law in a state of flux until the end of the window 
for such challenges, and potentially longer if such challenges are 
permitted. 
To limit the negative impact litigation over tax guidance would have 
on the agency’s revenue-raising function, the proposal suggests a 
window of time when litigation over procedural issues may proceed. 
Time limits are often jurisdictional, forcing the dismissal of claims if the 
time has lapsed, although courts often interpret these limits narrowly.479 
Thus, after the lapsed period, however narrowly interpreted, procedural 
claims are foreclosed. This rule precluding future review at the 
enforcement stage results from a compelling need to achieve consistent 
application of the tax code on a national basis. For consistency in 
application, the law needs to be settled; therefore, claims that do not go 
to the substance of whether the guidance has a statutory basis must be 
resolved and then put aside. 
This limited time frame is consistent with the Administrative 
Conference of the United States’s recommendation. The Conference 
recommends limiting review for complex areas of law because of the 
need for regulatory certainty and the presence of unrecoverable costs if 
the rule is overturned.480 “The uncertainty caused by the potential for 
conflicting court decisions and by the possibility that a rule may be 
overturned several years after its promulgation can be extremely 
disruptive of the regulatory scheme.”481 Moreover, limiting the period of 
review should increase participation in the rulemaking process, bring 
finality to the administrative process, and conserve administrative 
resources.482 
For example, the statute at issue in Eagle-Picher Industries v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,483 the Comprehensive Environmental 
                                                     
479. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 288–89 (1978); Eagle-Picher 
Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
480. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 82-7: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES 
IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 3 (1982).  
481. Id. at 2. 
482. Id. at 3. 
483. 759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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Response, Compensation Act and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 
provided that: 
Review of any regulation promulgated under [CERCLA] may 
be . . . made within ninety days from the date of promulgation of 
such regulations. Any matter with respect to which review could 
have been obtained under this subsection shall not be subject to 
judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for 
enforcement or to obtain damages or recovery of response 
costs.484 
This provision successfully limited the court and the timing in which 
cases could be heard.485 Even though the court grappled with issues of 
ripeness in its interpretation of its jurisdiction, the court accepted the 
limit as it applied. 
Despite much successful litigation on the topic of time limits, some 
courts may refuse to accept this type of limitation. For example, courts 
have ignored these types of limitations when they find petitioners lacked 
a meaningful opportunity to challenge the action during the review 
period because of a lack of notice, a lack of ripeness, or confusion in the 
law as to the proper forum of review.486 Similarly, courts may wait to 
hear challenges until after guidance is applied in order to prove 
sufficient hardship to warrant review.487 But these arguments are 
carefully scrutinized because of Congress’s stated desire to limit the 
review. Additionally, ripeness is less likely to be a concern within the 
narrow confines of procedural litigation. 
Nevertheless, despite this proposal’s focus on procedural issues, some 
substantive issues would be litigated before enforcement, such as 
whether the Treasury Department’s reading was consistent with the 
statute. However, the proposal does not close the door on future 
litigation of those substantive matters as well. Although litigants would 
lose the ability to litigate over specific APA procedural rights after the 
window closes, they would retain their right to litigate whether the 
guidance comports with the language of the statute. In doing so, the 
proposal seeks to encourage a focused look at procedure at the time 
guidance is issued and shortly thereafter, and then put the procedure to 
bed so that attention turns to the guidance’s substance. 
                                                     
484. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1982). 
485. Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 909. 
486. Recreation Vehicle Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 653 F.2d 562, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Geller v. 
FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 977–78 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 
1282–83 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
487. E.g., Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  
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One result of the proposal would be that some people initially 
indifferent or unaware of the guidance will not have the opportunity to 
litigate procedural matters when later affected by the guidance.488 
However, this curtailment of claims currently exists, although with 
longer windows, from the application of the general six-year statute of 
limitations.489 Moreover, shorter windows better balance the competing 
priorities these issues raise: holding agencies to the standards of the 
APA but also managing agency and judicial resources and creating 
reliable tax guidance. Shorter windows also encourage people to 
participate in the creation of guidance, the purpose for which the 
procedures were enacted, rather than waiting until after the fact to 
bemoan the result. This would ultimately strengthen the APA’s goal of 
fostering public involvement in rule-making. 
A final question is which courts should hear these claims. Generalist 
courts are likely preferable for this pre-enforcement litigation because 
substantive tax knowledge is not required. One could question the 
appropriateness of delegating federal procedural matters under the APA 
to a court specializing in substantive tax matters. Furthermore, retaining 
these cases in general federal courts would likely facilitate uniformity in 
administrative law as well as remove more of the silo around tax’s 
procedures. 
On the other hand, Congress could justifiably give the Tax Court the 
authority to hear these cases, despite the Tax Court having no particular 
specialty in administrative law. Although it has not been proven, the Tax 
Court might be more sympathetic to the difficulty of creating, and the 
need for, tax guidance. If Congress chose for these matters to be 
reviewed by the Tax Court, it would need to extend its jurisdiction. 
Under current law, Tax Court cases must involve refund procedures or 
other matters specifically granted jurisdiction by Congress.490 Therefore, 
although most tax cases originate in the Tax Court, its jurisdiction does 
not currently extend to purely procedural claims. 
There are risks to this proposal, even for those solely focused on 
taxpayers’ rights. To the extent pre-enforcement litigation grows as a 
share of the Treasury Department’s budget, it reduces the ability to 
engage in other activities. Those other activities, such as taxpayer 
education and responding to questions, may provide a larger benefit to 
                                                     
488. See Graceba Total Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 115 F.3d 1038, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Functional Music Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
489. See Debt Buyers’ Ass’n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). 
490. I.R.C. §§ 6213–6214, 7442; I.R.M. § 35.1.1 (Aug. 11, 2004), https://www.irs.gov/irm/ 
part35/irm_35-001-001.html [https://perma.cc/T7VR-T74R]. 
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taxpayers than litigation over guidance. The cost in terms of these other 
activities is greater because of the relative difficulty of cutting funding 
from, or ignoring, taxpayer litigation. Once litigation is allowed, the 
agency must devote resources to it if the agency is to retain the guidance. 
It is the proverbial squeaky wheel that demands resources to oil. 
Recognizing that it is difficult to create good guidance and that not 
everyone has the best of intentions with procedural litigation, this 
proposal seeks a balance. The proposal seeks to balance the need for 
guidance created with procedures that are respected by the agency and 
the public with the need for some limits on tax litigation. To do so, this 
proposed change would permit procedural litigation that meets the 
justiciability rules but does not permit this long after guidance has been 
operational. 
B. Recognizing the Injury 
Although the first proposal permits pre-enforcement litigation for 
those who could litigate the issues after the fact, it does not expand the 
issues to be litigated or the group who may engage in this litigation. To 
accomplish that feat is difficult, if not impossible. Some of the 
justiciability limitations that prevent third-party suits and early litigation 
are constitutional. They cannot be waived even with congressional 
action. This second proposal accepts that limitation but has Congress 
legislate recognition of the finality of, and possible injury from, 
guidance that works to change taxpayer behavior even though not in the 
form of final regulations. Additionally, Congress’s enactment would 
explain to the courts its understanding of how injuries exist with certain 
agency action and that third parties may be harmed when other taxpayers 
are given tax benefits. 
First, Congress should statutorily designate the forms of guidance that 
are subject to review. This list should include regulations and all tax 
guidance intended to change taxpayer behavior. Others have tied this 
issue to the deference given to tax guidance or the potential for 
triggering tax penalties; however, the more critical issue is the ability the 
agency has to influence behavior with guidance that was not given 
democratic review.491 
By limiting this proposal to guidance intended to change taxpayer 
behavior, every agency action will not be subject to notice-and-
comment. Only prospective rules are intended to change, as opposed to 
define, prior action. Additionally, the focus on changing behavior limits 
                                                     
491. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8. 
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the guidance subject to review to that altering baseline behavior rather 
than merely clarifying the application of the law. If Congress does not 
want a piece of forward-looking guidance to go through notice-and-
comment, for example if it wants to facilitate the listing of listed 
transactions, Congress can exempt the guidance from the APA in its 
statute. 
Consider the following example to clarify the distinction. The IRS 
issued Revenue Ruling 2001-4 to define the extent an airline can 
refurbish an airplane and claim a current deduction for the cost rather 
than booking it as a capital expenditure.492 The rule clarifies the 
application of the law to mitigate taxpayers’ need to find an answer. 
Under the proposal, this clarifying ruling would not be reviewable for 
testing whether it completed notice-and-comment. On the other hand, 
the notice warning of impending inversion regulations or the notice 
classifying transactions as listed transactions are forward looking and 
changes the law that previously existed. These notices are intended to 
change behavior and, therefore, the proposal requires they go through 
notice-and-comment unless an exemption is statutorily provided. 
This proposal would have produced different outcomes in some 
historical cases. It would likely have changed the result in Cohen, the 
case involving refund procedures, because refunds involve past 
taxpaying behavior.493 Guidance that imposes information reporting 
obligations would be reviewable depending on what the guidance does. 
If the guidance imposes new obligations rather than clarifying old ones, 
the guidance would require notice-and-comment and be subject to pre-
enforcement litigation. Thus, the proposal is not a bright-line rule but, 
nonetheless, imposes greater clarity and order than the existing, evolving 
common law. 
Although subjecting many forms of tax guidance to procedural 
review, this proposal does not suggest that Congress eliminate the varied 
forms of guidance. Congress should, however, require that all guidance 
intended to change behavior be held to the same level of review. In tax-
speak, substance should triumph over form. Even if a rule is not in a 
regulation, it should have the same opportunity for public comment if it 
has the same impact on the public. 
Listing guidance that is subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment 
procedures reduces the likelihood of successful agency defenses on the 
ground the guidance is not yet ripe. However, the law is not clear in this 
                                                     
492. Rev. Rul. 2001-3, 2001-1 C.B. 295. 
493. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015). 
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area, therefore congressional opinion may not sway a court. Under 
current law, non-legislative rules may not be ripe for judicial review, 
although some non-legislative rules have been determined to be ripe 
even though the direct injury or harm will not arise until (and unless) 
enforcement action occurs.494 Congressional action cannot undo the 
uncertainty in this area of jurisprudence but does mitigate it as much as 
possible. 
Second, Congress should legislate that, because of federal budget 
constraints, all taxpayers are injured by the application of tax reducing 
guidance.495 This is not arguing the government is entitled to all of a 
taxpayer’s income. It is arguing that tax preferences for some are 
inherently discriminatory against others, although possibly for good 
reasons. Although it might be politically popular to frame taxes as the 
taxpayer versus the government, in reality the better view is the taxpayer 
versus other taxpayers. As one taxpayer pays less in tax, to raise the 
same amount of revenue tax rates on others must increase. Even without 
the tax increase, the person who pays less tax has benefited relative to 
those who do not. 
Preferential treatment for some taxpayers receive narrow support 
from policymakers, while other preferences are created through 
democratic means. If the benefit is justified, as defined by society, the 
tax discrimination is fair and appropriate. The issue for this Article is not 
whether a particular form of favoritism is justified, but who gets to 
decide if the benefit is justified. When Congress enacts tax preferences, 
they are democratic even if sometimes unwise. When an agency creates 
a preference, it is less likely the preference is recognized as of 
democratic, rather than bureaucratic, origin. Only through the imposition 
of procedures, such as notice-and-comment, can the public be certain of 
its voice in the creation of the benefit. 
Moreover, this Article argues the procedure for creating the benefit 
should be subject to the same review as a tax burden would be. The 
irony of today’s system is that people can fight over the creation of tax 
burdens but not tax relief even though economists conclude they are the 
same.496 To impose a tax on one half of the country is economically 
equivalent to giving a tax break to the other half. Perhaps it derives from 
people’s fear of loss, but the taxpaying public is more passive to benefits 
given to others. This proposal ignores that sentiment and recognizes the 
                                                     
494. Compare Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808–11 (2003), with 
Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
495. For the recognition of the likely prudential challenges, see Part IV. 
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economic equivalence—not preventing either taxes or preferences but 
holding both to the same procedural standard. 
Through these two additions to existing statutory language, Congress 
strengthens the claim for the public to litigate procedural matters in tax 
guidance. This would open the door to court for rules that might 
otherwise never face judicial challenge. In the process, it furthers one 
purpose of the APA, to ensure the public’s involvement in the creation 
of the rules affecting the public by pushing them into a more democratic 
process. Not only would the litigation be more democratic because of 
more participants, it encourages the agency to adopt more democratic 
procedures. 
Thus, one point of this second proposed change is to increase the 
amount of litigation the IRS faces. In doing so, it would impose a cost 
on the tax system. That cost should be weighed in the decision to accept 
this proposal; however, it is a necessary cost if the government is to hear 
relevant procedural claims. It is an example of the necessary balancing 
of individual equity and administrability that must be undertaken if the 
tax system is to function fairly. To the extent that guidance has a 
negative effect on others, those others should be given the opportunity to 
voice their complaints in a meaningful way about the undemocratic 
nature of the guidance’s creation. Although these complainants can go to 
Congress, access to courts offers the possibility of more meaningful 
review, as recognized by the creation of the APA itself. 
Broadening the litigation pool is not without risk, however. Not only 
is it costly, permitting the voice of those not directly affected by 
guidance might have the unintended consequence of making it a tool for 
entrenchment. Regulatory capture theories suggest that businesses and 
the wealthy might influence policies not directly of interest to 
themselves in order to further their own interests in other ways. In tax, it 
is possible well established groups might litigate in order to free up 
revenue to fund their own projects or because of a dislike of those with 
less power. In other words, in a world of unintended consequences, 
opening the door to speakers does not guarantee the voices one would 
want or what those voices will say. Litigants may usurp courts to engage 
in a “kind of private conscription of public resources . . . that undermines 
a fully democratic effort . . . to allocate . . . limited [agency] resources to 
the most serious problems.”497 
This risk of usurpation is not specific to litigation over procedural 
matters and is of less concern in this context because the stakes are 
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relatively low. In other words, there is less risk of people engaging in 
pre-enforcement procedural litigation for reasons other than a concern 
with process because it is a narrowly defined exception to the 
prohibition on pre-enforcement litigation and should only change how 
rules are made rather than necessarily their substance. Making this 
incremental change to the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment 
Act provides an experiment to see exactly how the public will respond 
without a risk to the system overall. 
Even if Congress is persuaded to enact these changes, the future of 
the litigation would likely have an uphill judicial battle. As discussed in 
Part II, courts do not always recognize a connection between tax 
expenditures and spending much less between those who benefit from 
tax expenditures and those who do not. “Bare procedural violations” 
without a direct harm do not satisfy the injury in fact requirement; 
however, the proposal goes further and argues that an actual 
particularized injury occurs, although one that exists for all recipients of 
government programs.498 The constitutional requirement of injury in fact 
makes it harder to gain access for third-party suits in the tax context 
other than in the particular factual situation of Flast, and this proposal 
attempts to supply that injury. But courts may dismiss the harm. 
Although some courts may be reluctant, others may accept this as an 
opportunity to hear cases they are already moving to hear. Courts at 
times have been open to future harms or probabilistic harms as creating 
the requisite injury in fact. For example, in 2010 in Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms,499 an agency approved unconditional deregulation 
of a particular genetically modified alfalfa plant without a study required 
by law.500 Growers of conventional alfalfa sued on the grounds the 
deregulation violated the enabling statute. The lower courts sided with 
the conventional alfalfa growers and enjoined the planting of the 
modified alfalfa. Although reversing the injunction, the Supreme Court 
upheld the farmers’ standing even though their injuries were 
characterized by marketers as alleged risks of future contamination. On 
the other hand, in 2009, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,501 the 
Court held there was no standing for plaintiffs after the Forest Service 
approved a salvage sale of tracts of national forest land because there 
were no particularized affidavits to prove the injury in fact.502 The 
                                                     
498. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
499. 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
500. Id. at 152–55. 
501. 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
502. Id. at 494–96. 
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determination of standing in these cases is very much facts- and 
circumstances-specific so it is impossible to predict with certainty how 
courts will respond to this proposal. Nevertheless, with the current trend 
toward permitting procedural tax litigation, Congress should use the 
opportunity to make the litigation as comprehensive as possible. 
Courts generally permit Congress to limit prudential limitations and 
have respected congressional grants for citizen suits. For example, in 
Bennett v. Spear,503 the Supreme Court addressed the citizen suit 
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that authorizes “any 
person” to sue to challenge certain violations of the act.504 The Fish and 
Wildlife Service had issued an opinion on a reservoir; ranch operators 
and irrigation districts sued arguing the Fish and Wildlife Service did not 
use best scientific and commercial data available to create the rule as 
required by the ESA. The Court recognized that the ESA’s broad 
authorization of people to bring suits overturns the prudential 
requirement that the person’s interests be within the zone of interest 
protected by the statute. 
Therefore, to succeed, this proposal needs Congress to expressly state 
that it intends to waive the agency’s common law defenses to pre-
enforcement litigation in order to permit procedural claims by any 
person. Additionally, Congress must acknowledge that guidance 
intended to shape taxpayer behavior, even if designated by the agency as 
interpretive, is final for review. Finally, courts must recognize the 
statement as explaining that harms are, in fact, created when the 
Treasury Department or the IRS creates targeted preferences or 
anticipatory guidance to permit review. 
To be clear, this proposal does not vest judicial power over the policy 
choices contained within the guidance. Instead, the proposal provides 
that agencies cannot extend the law without using the same proper 
procedure necessary for all rules. In doing so, the proposal creates a 
more reasonable and fair tax system for everyone involved. The same 
tools that the APA extends to the public in other contexts would be 
employed in tax, and the judiciary would be recognized as the best 
means of following through with procedural challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
The Treasury Department and the IRS are given substantial discretion 
in creating the rules that implement the tax system. However, that 
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discretion is circumscribed by the APA, which demands procedures for 
the exercise of agency discretion. Unless Congress limits the application 
of the APA, the issuance of rules must be according to the arduous 
procedure laid out in statute. This is not an endorsement of forcing 
everything agencies do to go through notice-and-comment. However, 
until Congress legislates otherwise, courts must decipher what the APA 
requires for every piece of tax guidance, and taxpayers and the agency 
are left in limbo not knowing when notice-and-comment applies. 
Tax’s special statutory limitations and limited standing rules that 
prohibit pre-enforcement litigation highlight the historical 
exceptionalism of the tax system. If the tax system is now to operate like 
every other administrative system, the procedural rules protecting it need 
to be carefully evaluated to ensure they work in the new world order. 
The worst of all worlds is to create procedural challenges that can only 
be used by those seeking last-ditch efforts to eliminate their personal tax 
liabilities rather than trying to create a just and democratic tax system. If 
the old system is to be dismantled, the dismantling should be 
thoughtfully done. 
With the more frequent application of the APA to tax matters and the 
impact this has on the legitimacy of tax guidance, it has become clear 
that the litigation over procedures needs to occur before widespread 
reliance on the guidance. To permit this pre-enforcement litigation will 
require statutory change. That change needs to be circumspect because 
litigation imposes risks on the existence of the guidance itself and, 
perhaps more importantly, the tax agency’s budget. In a world of 
shrinking budgets, the Treasury Department currently spends three and 
one-half percent of its budget creating guidance.505 Although the 
Department of Justice handles most tax litigation, a portion of the 
Treasury Department’s tax enforcement budget is spent on litigation 
support. Broadening exceptions to permit ever more litigation may 
prevent the IRS and the administration from engaging in other, equally 
valuable efforts for taxpayers because litigation is not the end sought but 
the more democratic creation of guidance. 
That the proposals contained herein would increase the amount of 
litigation might bankrupt the tax system in much the same way as simply 
repealing the Tax Injunction Act. However, these narrow proposals are a 
necessary protection for taxpayer rights when accepting that procedural 
attacks will be permitted. And they do so in the narrowest way possible. 
If drug manufacturers deserved pre-enforcement understanding of the 
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law that was to apply in Abbott Laboratories, so too should taxpayers be 
entitled to that same information. Encouraging taxpayers to break the 
law in order to test its procedural integrity is a poor way to encourage 
faith in the federal tax system. 
 
